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Editorial 
 
Unknown to each other two groups of engineers and engineering educators began to consider aspects of 
philosophy and engineering. One held a workshop of engineers and philosophers- “Engineering meets 
Philosophy” at Delft University and the other held a special session at the annual Frontiers in Education 
Conference on engineering education and philosophy. Since then the former has held a biannual workshop that 
have resulted in two impressive publications. The other continued its discussions through FIE and ASEE 
conferences. There are now regular sessions on philosophy and engineering education at the annual FIE 
conferences. 
 
It was argued that all engineering educators should reflect on their personal philosophies of engineering education 
and pedagogy. For this to happen, however, there would need to be a more permanent home for philosophy within 
ASEE. The Technological Literacy Division of ASEE presented a substantial case for embracing philosophy and 
at the 2013 Atlanta meeting it was proposed that the Division should change its name and rationale to embrace 
both philosophy and engineering literacy. Subsequently these proposals were adopted by ASEE and the division 
is now the technological and Engineering Literacy and Philosophy of Engineering Division (TELPhE). It was 
made clear that it would collaborate with its cognate divisions to bring about the acceptance of the view that all 
engineering educators should have an operational understanding of their own philosophies and how these 
impacted on policy.  
 
At the same time the Division approved the development of a hand book and expressed the hope that a 
bibliography on engineering education and philosophy that been prepared for a one day workshop at FIE 2011 
would be revised and published. 
 
So far one peer reviewed handbook has been published with papers financed by the participating authors and 
other supporting sponsors. For the convenience of the reader the contents of the first handbook have been listed 
below the contents of this volume. We have changed the format of this volume to reduce costs. We hope that the 
reader will find it equally presentable. 
 
This second hand book has also been peer reviewed and financed by the authors and a third is in production. 
However, it only partially meets the needs of the division and those working in cognate areas. There are major 
issues about the content and method of teaching technological and engineering literacy that need to be debated for 
which a vehicle for publication is required. Because the Divisions officers wish to meet that need we have 
changed the title of this second handbook to include the term ‘educational’ and hope it will encourage members of 
the division and those working in cognate fields to consider contributing to this publication and helping it to 
develop. 
 
This issue focuses on pragmatism and one of its exponent s John Dewey and two relatively unknown twentieth 
century philosophers. The first is the twentieth century Jesuit philosopher Bernard Lonergan. The second is the 
Scottish Philosopher John Macmurray.  The reader will find that engineering education has much to learn from 
the work of these philosophers. 
 
The third issue will also include further studies of the pragmatists and John Dewey and tackle the thorny issue of 
the aims of education. The second is the Scottish Philosopher John Macmurray. 
 
Pragmatism, Practice, and Engineering 
 
Russell Korte 
 
Introduction 
This essay explores a practical perspective of 
engineering work grounded in a Pragmatist 
philosophy and Practice theory. Essentially, 
Pragmatism focuses on the practical outcomes of 
what we think and do. It is about making a 
difference in the world that matters (Dewey, 1938; 
Peirce, 1878; Rescher, 2000; Talisse & Aikin, 
2008). Practice theory frames and explains the 
activities that are continually performed, produced 
and reproduced through a dynamic entanglement 
of action, politics, communities, discourse, 
materials, tools, and human agents. These two 
related perspectives focus on the consequences of 
our ideas and the results of our work. Both 
perspectives have tremendous power to focus our 
inquiry, clarify our perceptions of the world, and 
organize our thinking.  
 
The questions guiding this essay are: (1) How 
might one approach the nature of engineering 
work from a practical perspective? (2) What does 
it mean to practice engineering? This emphasis is 
less on the ideal or formal scientific intentions of 
engineering education and more on the nature and 
consequences of engineering practices in the 
workplace.  
One of the unfortunate consequences of the 
fabulous rise of science over the past few centuries 
is the growing chasm between the views of 
scientific objectivity and human subjectivity. 
Pragmatism and Practice theory not only recognize 
the important effects of human interactions within 
societies, but also place human activity, with all of 
its subjectivity, center stage.  Thus, theorizing is 
an important component of Pragmatism and its 
efficacy derives from the utility of its guidelines 
for action (Rescher, 2000). It is this focus on 
action and everyday experience that distinguishes 
the overall Pragmatist and Practice efforts to make 
sense of things.  
 
Rather than pursuing idealist notions of what the 
world might be or ought to be like, Pragmatist 
philosophers focus on the “problems of everyday 
life in this messy world.” The chief aim is for 
solving problems (Kaplan, 1961, p. 13). And 
arguably one of the important tasks of a Pragmatist 
worldview is to make sense of the profound effects 
of science and technology on human civilization. 
As a result, Pragmatism provides a workable 
system of ideas (a philosophy) for integrating the 
beliefs and values of our current milieu (Kaplan, 
1961).  
 
An aim of philosophical inquiry is to develop a 
more adequate understanding of the world for the 
purpose of developing more adequate practices in 
the world. Philosophical inquiry helps us make 
better choices (Rescher, 2001). Through 
philosophical inquiry, we attempt to describe how 
the world hangs together and how it works at 
levels beyond that which empirical science has 
explained. Despite the power of science to explain 
enormously complicated phenomena, there are 
things that science has not, or cannot explain, such 
as human meaning, purpose, reality, and truth 
(Rescher, 2001). A more practical and systematic 
understanding about how things work is important 
for grappling with the more intractable problems 
found in the world.  
 
The next section briefly reviews a selection of 
important ideas of Pragmatism. This is followed 
by a selection of important ideas emerging as 
Practice theory. Pragmatism focuses on the 
consequences of or actions brought on by our 
system of ideas or beliefs. Practice theory is a 
collection of emerging theories about systematic 
actions, such as the work we do and why we do it 
the way we do. These brief and selective reviews 
lead to important implications for the work that 
engineers do.  
 
Pragmatism 
As a relatively recent development in the history 
of philosophy, Pragmatism encompasses a vast 
range of perspectives, ideas, and contradictions. 
Yet there are key ideas that differentiate 
Pragmatism from other philosophical perspectives 
and are useful to inform engineering practice. 
Three common areas of interest emphasized by 
Pragmatist philosophers are: (1) the focus on the 
practical consequences of action, (2) the primacy 
of community (social), and (3) the experiential 
grounding of problem solving (Bernstein, 2010).  
 
The words “pragmatism”, “practice”, and 
“practical” derive from the Greek word for action 
(πραϒµα). And although the early authors of 
Pragmatism did not use the word Pragmatism to 
describe their work, the word eventually came to 
describe a distinctive new American view of the 
world (Bernstein, 2010).  
 
Often considered the founder of Pragmatism, 
Charles Peirce (1878) proposed what became 
known as The Pragmatist Maxim stating that the 
courses of action suggested by an idea compose 
the sole meaning of that idea. It was actions and 
their entailing consequences, not ideals or 
principles that were foundational to the Pragmatist 
worldview. William James (1907/1995) extended 
this view to include not only the meaning of ideas, 
but also the notion of truth. He defined truth as 
what is better for us to believe rather than the 
classic notion that truth is an accurate 
representation of reality (Bernstein, 2010). This 
change in focus from abstract, ideal principles to 
practical consequences challenged the traditional 
ideas of the world and of reality—traditional ideas 
that are still strongly entrenched today. 
 
Bernstein (2010) described Charles Peirce’s 
development of a practical philosophy in the late 
1800s as a reaction against the dominant Cartesian 
ideas that claimed we have the power of 
introspection and intuition to learn the truth 
independent of the external world; we have the 
power to think without signs (language), and we 
can conceive of what is incapable of being 
recognized, known, or distinguished. These 
idealist notions of understanding the world drove 
the early Pragmatists away from philosophies 
based on idealism and realism that claimed we 
could accurately and with certainty represent the 
real world. The rise of science and a focus on 
practice and practical effects fostered the 
development of pragmatist thinking.  
 
In addition, Pragmatism rejected the Cartesian idea 
of objectivity and truth. The Cartesian 
Correspondence Theory of Truth claimed that 
there was a reality out there and any assertion of 
truth was justified to the degree that it 
corresponded to reality. For many simple 
assertions of the natural world this works very 
well. However, for the complex assertions 
regarding science, mathematics, history, or human 
and social phenomena the Correspondence Theory 
is untenable (Bernstein, 2010). Justifications of 
correspondence to reality rely on language, reason, 
and representations of reality that are prone to 
arbitrary factors of circumstance, power, and 
individual biases (Bernstein, 2010). To the 
Pragmatist, a more useful view of truth and 
objectivity comes out of an intersubjective (social 
or communal) justification. This aligns more with 
a Coherence Theory of Truth, which advocates a 
more consensual and situational explanation of 
truth. However, a Coherence Theory is not without 
criticism as an idealist perspective that eschews a 
mind-independent reality (Young, 2013).  
 
Another common criticism of this intersubjective 
view is that it is relative, which criticizes the 
accommodation of any view of the truth. Yet the 
Pragmatists propose that rather than resorting to a 
simplistic view of relativism, it is better to base 
truth on the results achieved from collective 
inquiry and deep critical analysis. Out of a deep 
commitment to systematic inquiry we might reach 
an adequate understanding of reality that works 
and is therefore the best available truth (Bernstein, 
2010). Truth is not something “out there” waiting 
to be discovered. It is what one constructs through 
inquiry. It emerges out of the careful, collective 
development of evidence or knowledge (Talisse & 
Aikin, 2008). The notion that truth is found in the 
practical outcomes of inquiry is controversial and 
challenged by others holding to a more idealist 
perspective. Yet James (1907/1995) countered that 
the concept of ideal truths is impractical and 
unrealistic—essentially, all we can really know 
comes from what we do in the process of inquiry 
and discovery. Systematic, collective inquiry is the 
best we can do to construct the best available truth. 
There is no delusion of or practical need for 
believing in an ultimate, certain Truth. Pragmatism 
views the notion of an ultimate Truth as a myth 
that we are better off ignoring. 
 
Currently, Pragmatist philosophers tend to invoke 
a deflationary theory of truth that avoids the 
controversy with Idealism by not affording too 
much status to the concept of truth. The deflated 
notion of truth appeals to many modern 
Pragmatists as an assertion, along with 
commitments that what is asserted will be 
supported by evidence and stand up to its 
challenges, or be abandoned. The Pragmatist 
theory of truth is that truth is fallible and is less 
about metaphysics and more about epistemology 
or learning from inquiry (Talisse & Aikin, 2008).  
 
The growing interest in the natural world and the 
notion that people are an integral part of the 
natural order of things led early Pragmatists away 
from the classical, theological perspectives of the 
world. The use of science as a means to inquire 
about the world came to be called Naturalism and 
was adopted as a foundational aspect of 
Pragmatism (Talisse & Aikin, 2008).  
 
There were two major components of Naturalism: 
methodological and nomological. A Naturalistic 
methodology of inquiry emphasizes the scientific 
method that is self-correcting and relies on 
experiment, empirical evidence, and public 
scrutiny. A methodological assumption of 
Naturalism is that there is an underlying continuity 
between science and philosophy. If new evidence 
challenges existing scientific beliefs— new 
evidence can challenge existing philosophical 
beliefs as well (a condition known as fallibilism). 
A nomological view claims that the world is 
natural and conforms to natural laws independent 
of our beliefs of them. However, we can use our 
understanding of these laws and their effects on 
our perceptions to ascertain what the real world is 
like and how it works (Talisse & Aikin, 2008).  
 
In addition, Pragmatic Naturalism contained a 
third component, Humanism, that is 
antireductionist in its goal of preserving and 
aligning scientific and philosophical work with the 
values and purposes of human beings. The 
humanist aspect of Pragmatic Naturalism rejects 
the reduction of values, aesthetics, and the social 
realm to the biology or chemistry of the human 
organism. Dewey’s (1938) view of the ‘spectator 
view of knowledge’ was similar in its rejection of 
pursuing knowledge without attending to how it 
affects human lives. 
 
There are problems with Pragmatic Naturalism. 
For example, integrating the nomological aspect of 
naturalism conflicts with a situational view 
emphasizing practical effects. Also, integrating 
humanism and naturalism poses difficulties when 
the goal of non-reductionism blocks the 
advancement of an inquiry, or when the scientific 
method used in the search for truth clashes with 
our evolutionary goals of survival or our 
humanistic values (Talisse & Aikin, 2008). These 
conflicting ideas are some of the lingering 
problems still to be worked out.  
 
Regarding the Pragmatist approach to beliefs, 
Talisse and Aikin (2008) described beliefs to be 
those thoughts that are held to be true and 
discernable because they entail related actions or 
consequences. We act according to our beliefs. 
This is a functional view of beliefs aligned with 
the Pragmatic notion that actions and 
consequences provide the sole meaning of our 
beliefs (Talisse & Aikin, 2008). Thus, it is the 
consequences of our ideas that are important, not 
the ideas alone. 
 
Common Pragmatic views hold that there are 
many views (or vocabularies) of the world (i.e., 
there are multiple metaphysics) each being more 
or less fit for interacting with the world (Talisse & 
Aikin, 2008). Thus the utility of a metaphysical 
perspective derives from its goodness of fit in a 
particular situation—and this measure can only be 
applied from within the stated view or vocabulary. 
Multiple views can easily conflict with each other. 
Pragmatists argue that criticizing one worldview 
by invoking the belief system of a rival worldview 
is useless, because it does not lead to useful action. 
To evaluate a worldview compared to an 
alternative worldview requires developing a 
higher-level worldview (a third vocabulary) that 
encompasses the two rival worldviews, along with 
a new set of criteria and measures to evaluate the 
utility of either one (Talisse & Aikin, 2008). 
Essentially, this argument states that one needs to 
find an overarching “common ground” 
encompassing both rival views before useful 
action can be taken to work out or criticize the 
differences. Rigidly holding to a single worldview 
risks stifling progress by blocking inquiry. The 
Pragmatic preference for inquiry and results 
professes that we can continuously invent or 
develop new ways of seeing the world (ideas) that 
are better than previous ones.  
 
Ideas are socially constructed for practical 
purposes. Despite a wide array of ideas included 
under the umbrella of Pragmatism, there is a 
common belief in the importance of “know-how, 
social practices, and human agency” (Bernstein, 
2010, kindle location 312). Menand (1997) 
described Pragmatist beliefs that ideas are not 
waiting to be discovered “out there”, but are 
created by people—they are the tools we use to 
help us get things done in the world in which we 
find ourselves. 
 
Regarding what we know and how we justify what 
we know (epistemology), there are conflicting 
narratives throughout the Pragmatist community 
(Bernstein, 2010). One narrative takes an anti-
epistemology view claiming that the whole notion 
of epistemology is irrelevant because: (a) there is 
no clear, universal standard of knowledge (i.e., 
relativist); (b) all standards of knowledge are 
historically and socially constructed (i.e., 
historicist); and (c) one is not committed to a 
position because it is correct (the truth), but rather 
because of reasons anchored in cultural, social, 
and historical contexts (anti-cognitivist). Truth is 
not the goal of inquiry—the goal is to find results 
that reduce conflict and promote consensus or 
collaboration among rivals in a community 
(Talisse & Aikin, 2008). What is important from a 
practical humanist perspective need not be deemed 
objectively true. 
 
There are also a counter-arguments to the anti-
epistemological view described above. Namely, 
that although there are multiple viewpoints of 
knowledge (relativism), generally, individuals 
propose that their view is better than others, which 
contradicts the idea of relativism. From an 
individual perspective, few individuals subscribe 
to relativist views of knowledge believing instead 
that their particular views are best. An counter-
argument against historicism stems from the claim 
that even though individuals in different cultural, 
social, and historical contexts produce knowledge 
related to their context, this is not the same as 
saying that knowledge is inherently socially 
constructed, and finally challenges to the anti-
cognitivist views claim that we can know things 
and value some ways of knowing over others 
(Rescher, 2001; Talisse & Aikin, 2008). There are 
important standards and justifications for what we 
know, although it is not because of some ultimate 
or universal Truth, the standards are based more 
on consensus and coherence within groups of 
people.  
 
Some commonality appears in a general 
Pragmatist epistemology that proposes a 
reconstruction of the theory of knowledge to 
recognize the interests and limitations of knowers. 
This epistemology includes three views of 
knowledge: (a) antifoundationalism—knowledge 
does not require, nor does it have to have a set of 
foundational knowledge or principles; (b) 
fallibilism—all knowledge is open to revision or 
rejection; and (c) instrumentalism—all knowledge 
and reasoning depend on one’s interests or 
intentions (Talisse & Aikin, 2008). These views 
profess that knowledge is conditional and 
situational. And the value of knowledge depends 
on its consequences or the actions it invokes. 
Focusing on action, an interesting set of emerging 
theoretical perspectives about practice link 
Pragmatism to the working world and contribute 
important insights to into the complex nature of 
practical activity. A general overview of emerging 
practice theories is described next.  
 
Practice 
Emerging Practice theories provide a strong 
complement to the focus of Pragmatism on the 
consequences of, or the actions brought about by 
ideas in the context of everyday life and work. The 
interest in new perspectives of human activity 
stems from the ideas that knowledge, human 
activity, science, language, social institutions, 
meaning, and human transformation are highly 
inter-related and mutually constituted within fields 
of practices (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; 
Nicolini, 2013; Schatzki, 2001). Bundles of 
interconnected practices define and are defined by 
the organizations and institutions within which we 
live and work (Nicolini, 2013). Pragmatism seeks 
to explain the link between ideas and actions, 
Practice theories explain how and why actions 
appear and proceed as they do in the world. As 
with Pragmatism, pluralism is a defining 
characteristic of Practice theories.  
 
Three different theoretical views of Practice have 
evolved recently: (a) Practice as an activity, (b) 
Practice as multiple activities embedded in 
systems of values, discourse and power structures, 
and (c) Practice as the reproduction and innovation 
of activities and their effects on society (Corradi, 
Gherardi & Verzelloni, 2010). Among these 
different views, Practice is studied as either an 
empirical object or an epistemological process of 
knowing. As an empirical object, studies focus on 
the activities, artifacts, and contexts of practice. As 
an epistemological process, studies focus on the 
creation and development of knowledge situated in 
particular collective activities (Corradi et al., 
2010). Common characteristics of practice theories 
are an emphasis on habitualized human activities 
and purposive human agency entwined in complex 
and multi-faceted social contexts (Sandberg & 
Dall’Alba, 2009).  
 
Feldman and Orlikowski (2011) described three 
principles of Practice theories: (a) a collection of 
activity that enacts (produces or reproduces) a 
social order or system, (b) the rejection of dualism 
in favor of the relations among things, and (c) the 
mutual constitution of phenomena. Current views 
of organization and the workplace recognize the 
complex, dynamic, distributed, novel, 
unpredictable, social, and emergent nature of 
human activity—in other words, human activity 
within complex adaptive systems. The analytical 
power of Practice theories derives from a non-
reductionist or holistic view of the workplace and 
work—one that is very compatible with a 
Pragmatist philosophy.  
 
The Practice perspective aims for a deeper 
understanding of the ways people live and work by 
taking a process and relational orientation 
emphasizing the interdependence of activity and 
performance from the level of the collective or 
group, which also includes processes of conflict, 
power, and politics. This interdependence is not 
only among the individuals in the group, but also 
includes the important influences and roles of 
materials, tools, rules, and communities in the 
work people do (Corradi et al., 2010; Engestrom, 
2000; Nicolini, 2013).  
 
Practices formulate and determine social orders by 
organizing human activities around a set of 
meanings, identities and behaviors (Schatzki, 
2001). Schatzki prefers the term arrangement 
instead of order and describes arrangements as an 
organized collection of activities in pursuit of 
some collective end governed by a set of 
acceptable rules, beliefs, and hopes.  
 
The interdependencies of people and their material 
environments vary in different contexts and at 
different times. Thévenot (2001) articulated 
different “pragmatic regimes” having different 
configurations of practices including the 
relationships between actors and their material 
environments. The differences essentially 
characterize practices inherent at micro-, meso- or 
macro-social levels of analysis. At the micro level 
(local level) of practice the individual personalizes 
or customizes activities for personal convenience. 
This level has minimal social influence except for 
the historical or path-dependent nature of the 
practices. At the meso-level of analysis, the 
activity shifts to the group level with a more 
conventional view of interaction with the material 
environment—one that can accommodate more 
than one individual interacting. An important 
component of this level is the individuals’ use of 
tools or models to monitor and predict interactions 
among the actors. The macro-level is the most 
social level of practice and relies on conditions of 
legitimacy (e.g., professions) as important 
influences on practices across larger social groups 
(Thévenot, 2001).  
 
A major stream of research in Practice theories 
focuses on activities (Corradi et al., 2010). What 
people do in organizational settings is the main 
focus of an activity system (Engestrom, 2000; 
Foot, 2014). An activity system includes an actor 
and an object that is the goal or desired result of an 
activity. In addition, the system includes tools 
(conceptual and material), rules, a community of 
relevant actors, and a division of labor 
(Engestrom, 2000). Thus, any activity (e.g., 
engineering, design, problem solving, 
management, production) is a complex system 
comprised of people, tools, goals, rules, actions, 
and social structures—along with the inherent 
conflicts among them. Rather than reducing 
practice to the actions that people do, a more 
holistic perspective recognizes the real and 
powerful effects of the context, artifacts, culture, 
politics, and institutional logics enfolding a 
practice.  
 
This brings us to the issue of practicing 
engineering in organizational settings—
specifically industrial and commercial 
organizations in contrast to academic 
organizations, although ideally there are many 
similarities—practically there are fewer 
similarities. Both types of organizations operate 
within institutional frameworks that structure their 
practices (Scott, 2003). And while the logics 
within these institutional frames differ, the 
entwinement and mutual constitution of the 
elements composing their practice fields operate in 
similar ways. 
  
Implications for Engineering Studies 
Looking to Pragmatism, James (1907/1995) noted 
that in our age of enlightenment the human 
preference for conceptual, theoretical knowledge 
marginalizes much of the experiential knowledge 
gained through our activities. Looking at 
engineering practice from the perspective of 
Pragmatism suggests several ideas for framing 
how engineering works. Pragmatism focuses our 
attention on the outcomes of the engineering 
process—not some idealized body of scientific or 
theoretical knowledge created for engineering in 
the world. An idea is valuable if it works, not 
because it is ideal. 
 
The main tenet of Pragmatism is that ideas should 
yield to the practical. A Pragmatic view of 
engineering practice perceives it to be embedded 
within a larger realm of social, cultural, and 
political systems—the so-called “messy world.” 
Therefore, the meaning of the work of engineers is 
described by the consequences of their actions, not 
some ideals drawn from a traditional natural 
scientific worldview. Engineering work is 
necessarily entangled with non-engineering human 
systems in all of their complexity, subjectivity, and 
unpredictability.  
 
A reductionist perspective of the world has a 
strong grasp on engineering—both in the 
education of engineers and in the practice of 
engineering (Bucciarelli, 2003). The predominant 
practices in engineering are anchored in a 
fundamental hierarchical view of reality with 
universal laws based on math and science at the 
top, followed by more localized theories and 
principles (Bucciarelli, 2003). Near the bottom of 
the hierarchy is the social world. This hierarchy 
fits the nature of engineering science that 
predominates the academy. However, the majority 
of engineering graduates that go on to practice 
engineering enter the world of industry. The world 
of practice in industry is a predominately social 
world.  
 
The need to recognize and value the social aspects 
of engineering work is gaining momentum in 
research and education. It has a longer history in 
industrial organizations. A good example of the 
importance of the social systems to engineering 
work was highlighted in a study of serial 
innovators (Griffin, Price & Vojak, 2012). In this 
work, successful innovators described how they 
bridged the technical and social worlds by 
considering the social and political systems at 
work as important variables integral to the creative 
process.  One innovator stated that, “It is not a 
project until it is accepted” (Griffin et al., 2012, 
kindle location 1696/4194). This emphasis on the 
consequences of the social process is a core 
element of Pragmatist and Practice worldviews.  
 
The value of using a practice lens to examine the 
work of engineering comes from increasing our 
understanding of what engineers do, how they do 
it, and why. One of the ongoing criticisms of 
engineering education is the gap between what 
students learn and what they need to do in the 
workplace after graduation. The majority of this 
work is the practice of engineering—typically in 
industrial and commercial organizations (Barley, 
2005; Heywood, 2005; Trevelyan, 2015). There is 
a critical difference between the ways engineering 
is practiced in higher education and the ways it is 
practiced in the workplace (Heywood, 2005; 
Korte, Sheppard & Jordan, 2008; Radcliffe, 2006). 
 Obviously, there are strong, systemic differences 
between the institutions of higher education and 
industry, although the recognition and appreciation 
of the consequences of these differences is less 
acknowledged. Trevelyan (2010, 2014) and Korte 
et al. (2008) made this point based on their 
empirical studies of engineering practice that 
repeatedly showed that practicing engineers do not 
consider much of their work on the job to be “real 
engineering.” It seems apparent from this work 
that a particular view of engineering in the 
academy marginalizes a large part of the actual 
practices of engineers on the job. For example, a 
broader view of engineering practice includes 
important processes of communication, 
negotiation, coordination, legitimation, conflict, 
power, politics, management, and organization 
among others (Korte et al., 2008; Trevelyan, 
2010). 
 
Applying Thévenot’s (2001) conceptualization of 
different regimes of practice to the practice of 
engineering helps to differentiate the various 
emphases found in practice at different levels of 
analysis. For example, individual engineers might 
use and develop idiosyncratic activities of 
convenience in their specific work tasks. At the 
next level, work groups of engineers might rely on 
more conventional practices that help coordinate 
their work among different individuals in the 
group and among different groups. This aspect of 
coordination was an important component of 
engineering work identified by Trevelyan (2015) 
in his extensive study of engineers at work. At the 
macro level of engineering the practices tend to 
conform to criteria of legitimacy held by the 
broader communities of applied sciences, business, 
and society. This categorization scheme provides 
insights into the sources of friction or conflict that 
emerge at the interfaces of these levels. Individual 
practices might more or less fit with group models 
of practice, which face pressures to conform to 
accepted or legitimate prescriptions of practice by 
the profession or community as a whole.  
 
These pressures to adapt were clearly found in a 
study of the experiences of newly hired engineers 
learning to practice in the contexts of large 
organizations. Many of these new engineers began 
by enacting ways of practicing engineering based 
on their schooling and consequently they found 
they needed to adapt to a different set of 
expectations affecting the practices in their work 
groups (Korte et al., 2008). Furthermore, they 
often encountered tensions between their 
individual practices, the practices of the group, and 
the legitimate expectations of the organization, the 
profession, and society as a whole.  
 
The dynamics of the social world are less 
amenable to the reductionist, objectified, and 
nomological mindset strongly linked to the natural 
sciences. Practice theories and supporting 
Pragmatist philosophies are powerful analytical 
tools for examining and understanding the 
dynamics of the practices that make up the 
organizations in which engineering is a part. 
Practice theories link the action-oriented and 
consequential values of Pragmatism to the 
everyday activities of work and its outcomes. The 
emphasis is on what people do and what that doing 
does for society (Corradi et al., 2010). Thus, what 
engineers do is an important defining principle of 
engineering practice. And what they do at work 
largely includes social processes (Bucciarelli, 
2003; Korte et al., 2008; Trevelyan, 2015).  
 
The philosophy of Pragmatism and the theories of 
Practice are relatively new ideas still under 
development, yet they offer exciting insights for 
reframing our views of engineering—especially 
for the profession and the work of engineers. 
Engineering is a practical endeavor and the 
principles, beliefs, and values put forth by 
Pragmatism, along with the analytical power of 
emerging Practice theories offer a means to work 
out some of the tensions and shortfalls of more 
traditional and idealistic views of engineering.   
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 The Relevance and Significance of Deweyan Pragmatism for Engineering Education 
Mani Mina and Iraj Omidvar 
Abstract  
Focusing on pragmatism of John Dewey, this chapter explores the 
tectonic theoretical shift that has turned “activity” into the central 
trope of Western philosophy and has the potential not only to re-locate 
engineering from the margins of epistemology to its center by 
reframing the relationship between theory and practice but to permit 
engineering educators to reconceptualize their work in ways that are 
dramatically different from how they have traditionally. This chapter 
will examine these topics by focusing on how American Pragmatism 
as articulated by John Dewey relates to and informs engineering 
philosophy.  The chapter will also explore some of the implications of 
his philosophy for engineering education.   
 
Introduction 
We are heirs to a long tradition in philosophy 
going back to Plato and Aristotle that separates 
and opposes “theory and practice” and “knowing 
from doing.”(Dewey, 1991) [1].Although the 
philosophical justifications for the opposition have 
been comprehensively refuted over the centuries, it 
continues to shape how we view certain aspects of 
our disciplines, professions, and political and 
economic habitats, for example, the gulf between 
the mind and the body (a gulf whose implications 
in the U.S. can be seen for example in insurance 
coverage for ailments that are considered 
psychological as opposed to physical), the division 
of universities into humanities fields on the one 
hand and scientific/technical fields on the other 
(and the associated pay scales), the division of 
various fields into pure/theoretical versus 
practical/experimental, and the gendered division 
of labor in many scientific and engineering fields 
versus many fields in the humanities, among many 
other such divisions within society (Dewy, 1916; 
Dickstein, 1998; Hickman, 1990, 2001; Hollinger 
and Depew, 1995).    
 
Modern philosophy of science, as for example 
formulated by Karl Popper (Dickstein, 1998, p 
217) in part emerges from an uncompromising 
critique of this philosophical tradition we have 
inherited as well as from a reframing of 
justifications for reliable, objective knowledge as 
grounded in how actions are performed and 
socially critiqued.  Thus, modern philosophy of 
science reflects a major shift that reconnects 
theorizing with practice (or activity involving 
problematization, hypothesization, prediction, 
experimentation, and analysis) and insists on the 
pivotal role of what Popper calls the “social 
institutions” of science or open/public critique of 
claims (replication and peer/external review) 
(Dewey, 1938; Dickstein, 1998) 
 
However, many important implications of this 
epistemological shift have not been sufficiently 
appreciated and continue to shape educational 
policies, practices and beliefs.  John Dewey’s 
pragmatism is not only a radical break from that 
philosophical tradition but offers a 
comprehensively fleshed-out framework that 
accounts for many of the implications of the 
epistemological shift.  Although some of the key 
concepts and arguments of American Pragmatism 
as a distinct philosophical current were first 
formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) 
and popularized for a general academic audience 
by William James (1842-1910), it was John 
Dewey (1859-1952) who developed them 
extensively in a body of work constituting some 37 
volumes [2] written over a span of nearly seven 
decades.  Dewey’s version of American 
Pragmatism – which at different stages during his 
long career he called “instrumentalism,” 
“experimentalism,” and in his later works, simply 
“technology” [3]– examines such areas of 
philosophy as theory of knowledge, metaphysics, 
ethical and social theory, and aesthetics.  A 
particularly important area of exploration for 
Dewey was educational philosophy, and he has 
bequeathed a number of influential works that 
remain required reading in American colleges of 
education. In fact, with time the influence of some 
of his ideas in American education has grown.  
The Boyer report, for example, references him 
thus: 
 
“Undergraduate education in research universities 
requires renewed emphasis on a point strongly 
made by John Dewey almost a century ago: 
learning is based on discovery guided by 
mentoring rather than on the transmission of 
information”.[4] 
 
In the following section, we will outline some 
aspects of his philosophy that relate to engineering 
education and philosophy of engineering. 
 
Dewey’s Central Concern:  “The Formation of 
Good Ideas [5] 
The major problem Dewey grappled with at every 
level of philosophical analysis—whether  
educational, scientific, aesthetic, political, etc.—is  
how we can arrive at good ideas (depictions, 
words, explanations, images, etc.).  He wanted to 
know how in goal-oriented, communal (conjoint or  
cooperative) activities of humans made possible 
through communication, we can successfully take  
the critical step of arriving at good ideas for 
surmounting difficulties and solving problems.  
 
He believed that not just the happiness and 
prosperity but the survival of the individual and of 
society depend on the success of humans in 
forming good ideas.  His philosophy aims at 
creating conditions that ensure the continued 
possibility of that success.   Thus he was after 
mindsets, mechanisms, and approaches to 
knowledge communication and creation that are 
self-correcting, combat intellectual ossification, 
and resist disciplinary orthodoxies and dogmas.   
And he sought a society in which the idea and 
practice of reform are deeply incorporated.  His 
epistemological and political models for achieving 
these goals are scientific and democratic, 
respectively.  Moreover, as will be outlined 
shortly, his theory of inquiry and philosophy of 
education have very close affinities with 
engineering.   
 
For Dewey, what constitutes “good ideas” has to 
be sought in activity, or in his writings on theory of 
knowledge, inquiry. Dewey's philosophy is based 
on his observations of the living organism.  In 
Logic:  The Theory of Inquiry (Dewey, 1916), he 
begins by noting that organisms are already living 
within an environment.  Through their activities, 
they and their environments change and adjust to 
each other; thus organisms are in a state of flux 
and movement.  In order for organisms to maintain 
life they have to seek equilibrium with the 
environment through activities that change them 
and the environment.  They come out of balance 
with their environment (they become hungry, are 
threatened or hurt, etc.), and they seek to restore 
the balance.  This seeking to restore balance 
foreshadows his theory of inquiry.  For example, 
when an animal is hungry, it will look around and 
search for food.  Through experience of finding 
food, it forms a store of knowledge, in some 
animals in the form of useful habits and in higher-
order animals and specially humans in the form of 
both useful habits but also a store of memories 
(Dewey, 1916). 
 
Organisms through their movement to and from 
disequilibrium and equilibrium refine and improve 
their methods.  He refers to this continual 
refinement and improvement as “growth.”  Thus, 
in Democracy and Education, Dewey writes that 
the aim of life is growth, which he defines as "a 
self-renewing process through action upon the 
environment" (Dewey, 1962).  In Reconstruction 
in Philosophy, he writes that: “The process of 
growth, of improvement and progress, rather than 
the static outcome and result, becomes the 
significant thing. . . . Not perfection as a final goal, 
but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, 
maturing, refining is the aim in living.  Honesty, 
industry, temperance, justice, like health, wealth 
and learning, are not goods to be possessed as 
they would be if they expressed fixed ends to be 
attained.  They are directions of change in the 
quality of experience”(Dewey, 1936). 
 
Of particular relevance to philosophy of 
engineering is that Dewey sees this growth as 
being mediated, that is, being achieved through 
means, methods, and ways.  Dewey’s preferred 
word for describing the character of this mediation 
is “tool.”  Organisms “use” these means or tools to 
effect change.  Thus, in pragmatic theory of 
knowledge, technology – its use and production – 
is closely associated with activity and is central to 
the theory. 
 
According to Dewey, one key tool humans have 
created in the communal activities involved in the 
pursuit of equilibrium is communication through 
language.  Several important features of Dewey's 
philosophy find expression in the previous 
sentence.  First, language, according to Dewey, is 
a technology bound up with (or subsumed under) 
activity.  Second, activities aimed at solving 
problems are chiefly social or communal.  He 
defines language broadly to include "all means of 
communication such as, for example, monuments, 
rituals, and formalized arts. Language is the 
record that perpetuates occurrences and renders 
them amenable to public consideration” (Dewey, 
1991).  He writes that the meaning communicated 
through language "is established by agreements of 
different persons in existential activities having 
reference to existential consequences" (Dewey, 
1991).  Through language, we evoke "different 
activities performed by different persons so as to 
produce consequences that are shared by all the 
participants in the conjoint undertaking" (Dewey, 
1991). 
 
By emphasizing the commun- in communication 
and the development of language, Dewey 
underscores the intimate connection among 
community, language, and thinking.  According to 
Dewey, the human ability to think is “a product of 
the fact that individuals live in a cultural 
environment.  Such living compels them to assume 
in their behavior the standpoint of customs, beliefs, 
institutions, meanings and projects which are at 
least relatively general and objective" (Dewey, 
1991). In short, thoughts, theories, and concepts 
are also tools.  Dewey considers language the “tool 
of tools” [2] and thinking, a particular form of 
technology use. 
 
In this model, the formation of ideas – theorizing – 
is the pivotal stage for humans in completing the 
communal activity.  Stripped of his broader 
philosophical outlook, this pivotal stage (or 
Dewey’s theory of inquiry) is the familiar 
scientific method, which he variously calls the 
process of inquiry, critical or reflective thinking, or 
a “complete act of thought” (How We Think) 
(Fishman and McCarthy, 1998), which he divides 
into five steps, which are very similar to those 
involved in problem solving that engineering 
programs teach students and can serve as a good 
point of departure for understanding how these 
steps are used in his philosophy.  Dewey’s five 
steps to thinking are "(i) a felt difficulty; (ii) its 
location and definition; (iii) suggestion of possible 
solutions; (iv) development by reasoning of the 
bearings of the suggestion; (v) further observation 
and experiment leading to its acceptance or 
rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or 
disbelief" (Fishman and McCarthy, 1998).  
 
A complete act of thought begins with a problem, 
a term he uses in a very broad sense to cover a 
wide range of phenomena:  a felt difficulty, 
puzzlement, a major obstacle, an opposing force or 
conflict, a break in expectations, an anomaly, etc.  
The problem itself arises from already on-going 
activities of the inquirer. Dewey considers step 
(iii), suggestion, “the very heart of inference; it 
involves going from what is present to something 
absent.  Hence, it is more or less speculative, 
adventurous.  . . . .The Suggested conclusion so far 
as it is not accepted but only tentatively 
entertained constitutes an idea.  Synonyms for this 
are supposition, conjecture, guess, hypothesis, and 
(in elaborate cases) theory" (Fishman and 
McCarthy, 1998).   On step (iv), reasoning, he 
writes, "The process of developing the bearings--
or, as they are more technically termed, the 
implications--of any idea with respect to any 
problem, is termed reasoning.  As an idea is 
inferred from given facts, so reasoning sets out 
from an idea" (Dewey, 1991).  Dewey finds 
“theory” in steps (iii) and (iv), that is, as stages in 
inquiry.  He does not contrast “theory” with 
activity or practice as does the philosophical 
tradition we have inherited from the Greeks, but he 
sees theory as part of practice or framed by it 
within the inquiring activities of agents. 
 
For Dewey, steps (ii) and (v) identify the key 
stages of the interaction between the organism and 
the environment. Of importance to the philosophy 
of engineering are Dewey’s explanations of those 
steps.  He writes (Logic) that in "the more complex 
organisms, the activity of search [ii and v] 
involves modifications of the old environment [the 
environment in which the problem has been 
encountered], if only by a change in the 
connection of the organism with it" (Fishman and 
McCarthy, 1998).  In other words, steps (ii) and 
(v) require "the transformation of the situation . . . 
. [which] is existential and hence temporal." In the 
search, the inquirer goes to and, in the process, 
interacts with and changes the environment.  Thus, 
in Dewey’s pragmatic model of knowing, activity 
and practice are the broad framework for what it 
takes to know, which is a stage in the 
“modification of the old environment” and 
“transformation of the situation” through the use 
of conceptual and other tools.  The modification 
and transformation are not what, say, a special 
field of knowledge such as engineering does; 
rather they represent what any community that is 
trying to know something must do.   
 
Education and Reform in Dewey 
Dewey is, first and foremost, a reformer.  In 
Experience and Education (Dewey, 1936)Dewey 
argues that in a sense, a good education aims to 
free students of their impulses (see the next 
subsection for his ideas on growth).  He considers 
real freedom to be “power to frame purposes, to 
judge wisely, to evaluate desires by the 
consequences which will result from acting upon 
them; power to select and order means to carry 
chosen ends into operation” (Dewey, 1936). For 
Dewey, the starting point of all knowledge is the 
lived experience of the individual in the world of 
the common sense. For individuals, knowledge 
begins from what they value and already 
understand of their lives.  He writes, “Natural 
impulses and desires constitute in any case the 
starting point.  But there is no intellectual growth 
without some reconstruction, some remaking, of 
impulses and desires” (Dewey, 1936).  Dewey is 
concerned that individuals in society and in school 
often do things either impulsively or by force of 
authority.  The external constraint imposed by 
society is useful in that it moderates and controls 
impulses.  But he believes the better source of 
constraint or “inhibition” is through one’s own 
reflective or critical thinking (Dewey, 1936).  In a 
memorable passage, Dewey writes “thinking is 
stoppage of the immediate manifestation of 
impulse until that impulse has been brought into 
connection with other possible tendencies to action 
so that a more comprehensive and coherent plan 
of activity is formed. Some of the other tendencies 
to action lead to use of eye, ear, and hand to 
observe objective conditions; others result in 
recall of what has happened in the past.  Thinking 
is thus a postponement of immediate action, while 
it effects internal control of impulse through a 
union of observation and memory, this union being 
the heart of reflection.  What has been said 
explains the meaning of the well-worn phrase 
“self-control.”  The ideal aim of education is 
creation of power of self-control (Dewey, 1936). 
 
Goal of Education for Society:  Creating 
Conditions of Continued Growth 
Dewey believed that through the exercise of 
intelligent freedom or “self-control,” students may 
be in the best position to ensure continued 
conditions of growth.  Dewey's educational goal is 
all around growth, not only for students but also 
for society (Democracy and Education) (Dewey, 
1916).  And again by growth he means a type of 
interaction with the environment through which 
both the organism and the environment mutually 
adapt to and shape each other.  He wants to 
provide society with what it needs to perpetuate 
itself, to create conditions of growth that are most 
conducive to further growth.  This suggests the 
value of students’ autonomy and their ability to 
shape the educational experience. 
 
DEWEYAN EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND SOME 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ENGINEERING EDUCATION 
As mentioned, for Dewey, the goal of education is 
freedom, “power to frame purposes,” to judge 
wisely, to evaluate desires by the consequences 
which will result from acting upon them; power to 
select and order means to carry ends (purposes) 
chosen by the student into operation.  The final 
goal is creating conditions of growth through 
democratic social and institutional arrangements, 
with ever greater intelligent participation of 
members. 
 
Through open channels of communication and 
commitment to dialogue and criticism, Dewey 
hoped that both society and the individual could 
create conditions conducive to forming good ideas. 
These good ideas will lead to better decisions that 
result in greater flourishing and development of 
the individual. Through the process of open 
communication (as part of society’s general 
projects of inquiry), both the individual and 
society will be transformed for the better. 
 
These ideas are in broad agreement with 
contemporary philosophy of science.  As Karl 
Popper writes, “objectivity is closely bound up 
with the social aspect of scientific method,” which 
results “from the friendly-hostile co-operation of 
many scientists” (Dickstein, 1998). Of crucial 
importance is “free criticism,” (Dewey, 1938) 
which takes place in “the various social 
institutions” (emphasis his) such as “laboratories, 
the scientific periodicals, and congresses.”  
 
There are at least four key aspects of Dewey’s 
theory that have important uses and implications 
for the philosophy of engineering education.  
These involve the development of an attitude of 
skepticism, valuing change individually and 
organizationally, emphasizing the centrality of 
context, and the importance of teaching the 
function of theory in the process of inquiry. 
 
First, Dewey argues that knowledge never leaves 
the realm of theory and remains forever subject to 
change, and inquirers should leave open the 
possibility that their firmest ideas and most 
cherished solutions may need to be modified or 
scrapped.  The effectiveness of science and 
engineering emanates exactly from this 
characteristic.  And engineers and scientists would 
do well to pass on this mindset to their students by 
creating an environment that genuinely encourages 
this skeptical attitude, which can be adopted 
primarily in practice, during the activities involved 
in inquiry   Students need a safe environment and 
enough time and resources to question and reject 
received explanations and to attempt to find better 
ones. 
 
Second, Dewey argues that all inquiry involves 
transforming the environment. Knowledge making 
is by definition transformative.  The type and 
extent of transformation, of course, has to do with 
the goals of inquiry.  For Dewey, an inquiring 
mind is going to change the environment in some 
way, disrupt the old ways of doing things.  It will 
be respectful of past ways of doing things but will 
not revere those ways so much so as not to try new 
ways.  Thus, the educational environment should 
anticipate, encourage, and adapt to such changes.  
As lines of inquiry in pursuit of meaningful 
answers to problems that genuinely matter to 
students are pursued, instructors should be open to 
changing their syllabi, their projects, their teaching 
strategies, etc.  And they should gear their 
instructions to specific needs of students.  
Departments need to understand this necessary 
step in inquiry and accommodate instructors.  Such 
changes cost money and resources, but if the goal 
is the teaching of thinking, then Dewey at least 
would argue that the cost is well spent, since the 
alternative is directly inimical to thinking. 
 
Third, Dewey argues that facts are facts in the 
context of inquiry.  They are "operational . . . . 
[and] not self-sufficient and complete in 
themselves.  They are selected and described . . . 
for a purpose, namely statement of the problem 
involved in such a way that its material both 
indicates a meaning relevant to resolution of the 
difficulty and serves to test its worth" (Dewey, 
1916). One implication of this position is that the 
teaching of facts outside the context of inquiry is 
counterproductive.  Schools spend a great deal of 
time teaching facts outside the context of inquiry.  
And students spend much of their time 
memorizing such facts, which they promptly forget 
after tests.  If the inquiry genuinely matters to 
students, they will seek out the facts and remember 
them long after the problem has been solved. By 
not requiring students to memorize large quantities 
of decontextualized facts, time is freed for inquiry, 
including the pursuit of facts that are relevant to 
the inquiry.   
 
Fourth, Dewey argues, "science takes its departure 
from commonsense," which consists of "beliefs, 
conceptions, customs and institutions”.  Dewey 
emphatically argues against teaching to students 
the findings of science as ready-made ideas to 
believe in. This is an issue of belief. It is not 
enough merely to repeat that all findings of science 
are hypothetical or theoretical.  Rather, students 
should come to see the theory in the context of a 
meaningful inquiry, which advances their vision 
and capability, and helps them grow.  Only while 
the theory plays its function in the process of 
inquiry can it be understood as did the scientists 
who came up with the theory and examined it in 
the first place.   
 
But there is a much deeper issue implied in the 
observation that the starting point of science is the 
world of commonsense.  For the student – that is, 
from within the student’s schema of knowledge – a 
theory taught outside the context of inquiry 
remains a dogma, and a student who believes in it 
has practiced exactly what science is designed to 
circumvent:  accepting claims on mere authority, 
that is, accepting claims without examining the 
reasons and evidence.  Here Dewey makes an 
important observation.  He argues that students 
accept such dogmas because of factors that are 
external to the subject matter of inquiry:  Gaining 
approval and avoiding sanction, promise of later 
understanding, etc.  To say that an educator should 
create conditions in which the inquiring minds of 
students are engaged requires that problems be 
relevant and of importance to students; the 
problems should matter to students’ lives; they 
should, one way or another, fit in with the broader 
constellation of concerns of students’ needs, aims, 
and values.  
 
For example, for Dewey, expecting students to 
register in classes for no other reason than four 
years in the future they will be able to get a good 
job is tantamount to expecting students to engage 
in a set of activities that, in terms of the subject-
matter, is not only irrational but detrimental to 
their intellectual development.  To use Dewey’s 
framework, students who engage in activities 
(processes of inquiry) whose purposes they do not 
understand are acting by means of external 
constraints.  Students who do not understand and 
care for the problem cannot meaningfully search 
for possible solutions, formulate questions, and 
test their guesses.  Consequently, their activities 
will be directed not because of the intelligent 
operations of their thoughts in an environment 
geared towards learning something about the 
subject-matter, but because they want to receive a 
certain grade, or to graduate and earn a certain 
salary, etc.  In such a context, students are learning 
something, but what they are learning is that the 
subject matter is irrelevant to their lives and that if 
they wish to surmount a problem that does 
genuinely matter to them (receiving a good grade, 
a good job down the road, etc.), they have to 
engage in a set of irrational and arbitrary activities 
that they do not care about. 
These considerations led Dewey to grapple with a 
critical educational problem:  the connection 
between student interest and curriculum.  When 
students enter a disciplinary discourse community 
such as electrical engineering, they are confronted 
with a set of disciplinary problems.  If the 
problems the discipline is facing or has faced and 
solved are also not problems for students, they will 
not enter the process of inquiry.  According to 
Dewey, an educational arrangement in which 
students do not find the subject-matter of study 
inherently interesting has failed on several levels, 
perhaps the most obvious being, the failure of the 
educational program to offer students an opening 
for thinking. 
 
But Dewey considers the harm done to the 
discipline and society equally disconcerting.  
Given his belief in the urgent necessity of the 
possibility of continued reform (growth) both in 
science and in society, Dewey has a special esteem 
for schools, which he considers to be social spaces 
in which ideas about change in science and society 
can be formed and tested.  As Fishman and 
McCarthy write, “Dewey wants to develop an 
experimental spirit . . . in pupils.  For . . . although 
Dewey cares a great deal about student mastery of 
subject matter--insisting that to be part of a 
community is to share common language, values, 
and practices--he is equally concerned that 
students develop critical methods or habits of 
thought so that communal traditions can be tested 
and revitalized.” (Petroski, 2010). 
 
For Dewey, a genuine learning environment (a 
disciplinary discourse community) not only 
permits but also encourages and expects 
challenges to its established views and 
assumptions and patterns of professional and 
administrative behavior. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
As Gravander (2014) points out, “In contrast to the 
philosophy of science’s relatively long history as a 
field of inquiry, the philosophy of engineering has 
only recently begun to emerge” (see also Grimson, 
2014). This delayed emergence is itself a 
consequence of the continued presence and 
persistence of the traditional epistemological 
framework that modern philosophy of science 
replaced. As Larry Hickman points out, the 
tradition in philosophy we have inherited from the 
Greeks makes a distinction between theory and 
practice and sets theory above practice and in fact 
makes a further distinction between practice and 
production and sets practice above production 
(Hickman, 2001).  In this scheme, theory, the 
highest knowledge is the contemplation of 
permanent forms, the true reality behind the 
multiplicities of the perceived world.  Participation 
in the activities of moral and political life of 
society are also valued if they are informed by the 
insights of theory; least valuable is the work of the 
producers, artisans, that is, blacksmiths, 
carpenters, and other proto-engineers and makers 
of things. 
 
Although in all major currents of contemporary 
philosophy, “practice” has become the central 
epistemological trope, many disciplines, including 
engineering and engineering education, justify 
their curricular choices and pedagogic practices in 
terms that make a sharp distinction between 
thinking and doing, between thought and action, 
between theory and practice.  
  
Deweyan pragmatism offers one of the most fully 
developed responses to the philosophical tradition 
that separates theory and practice and proposes an 
alternative theory of knowledge based on the idea 
of inquiry that repositions engineering as a 
paradigmatic discipline within the constellation of 
academic disciplines.  In pragmatism, thoughts and 
theories are conceptual tools used within some 
stages in inquiring activities, which always require 
some form of modification or transformation of the 
existing situation and environment.  Thus, pivotal 
concepts of pragmatic theory of knowledge are 
activity (practice, action, doing, etc.), tool 
(technology), and change in environment 
(experimentation) aimed at overcoming obstacles 
(problem solving) encountered by the community.  
Together, these concepts provide a framework that 
is easily recognized by practicing engineers[2: 7]. 
 
Deweyan pragmatism also offers a powerful 
framework for engineering education.  By not 
adopting the theory-application dichotomy, and by 
instead offering a model of inquiry that carefully 
defines activity and frames thinking and theorizing 
as a step in activity, pragmatism allows 
engineering educators to think productively about 
the connections among the student, the discipline, 
and larger society and about the role of purpose 
and value in engineering education.  The 
framework allows engineering educators to 
incorporate concepts that are often seen to belong 
outside the domain of a “practical” field.  In 
Deweyan educational philosophy, the goal of 
education is freedom, that is, the student’s ability 
to formulate intelligent purposes.  And a Deweyan 
philosophy of engineering education would insist 
that students cannot be presented with unchanging 
goals of their education, unchanging results of 
other people’s inquiries as “knowledge,” and 
unchanging paths to achieving those results as 
“method,” and then expected to become inquirers.   
 
An educational program along Dewey’s pragmatic 
lines would insist that engineering students 
participate in formulating the ends and means of 
their activities, that is, engage in rational 
assessment of values, whether accepted values 
(standards) or pursued values (goals), at every 
stage of their education. Such an educational 
program would encourage students to formulate 
their goals and interests, critique them from 
multiple angles, settle on some goals, actively 
think about and research the routes to achieving 
those goals, while remaining open -- given the 
resources available -- to revising both the paths 
and the goals. 
 
Notes 
[1] Dewey, John. Democracy and Education.  P. 265. 1916. The Free 
Press, NY. 
 
[2]The 37-volume collection, edited by JoAnn Boydston, is grouped as 
The Early Works, 1882-1898, The Middle Works, 1899-1924, and The 
Later Works, published by Southern Illinois UP, Carbondale, IL. 
 
[3] Hickman, John Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology. Page 3. 
 
[4] Page 15. The Boyer Commission on Educating Undergraduates in 
the Research University. Reinventing Undergraduate Education: A 
Blueprint for America’s Research Universities.  State University of 
New York—Stony Brook, 1998. 
 
[5] An earlier draft of this section appeared in Mani Mina, Iraj 
Omidvar, and Kathleen Knots, “Learning to think critically to solve 
engineering problems: Revisiting John Dewey’s ideas for evaluating 
engineering education,” presented at the 2003 ASEE Annual 
Conference, Nashville, TN, June 2003.  
 
[6] Hickman, 44, also 58.  John Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology. 
 
[7] Consequently, in the Deweyan pragmatic approach one can argue 
engineering whose aim is to explore, modify, invent, maintain, and 
change things is at the center.  Therefore, the engineers are the agents 
that would bring actions to go from “Thoughts to Things.”  They are 
problem solver and problem definers and at times problem creators.  
They are the modern artisans who change our lives with technology as 
their main weapon of expression. 
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Engineering Insight. The Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan Applied to 
Engineering 
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Abstract—This paper presents the application of Bernard Lonergan’s 
seminal work, Insight to the Philosophy of Engineering. Using a 
pragmatic theory of knowledge as a lens for examining the nature of 
engineering design as activities of knowing and willing, Lonergan's 
approach offers a knowing-based approach with the flexibility needed 
for an epistemology of the many-sided activity of engineering. With 
his account of the basic method of the human mind underlying 
specialized methods, he also offers a basis for unifying the theory and 
pedagogy of engineering. Moreover, in carefully relating knowing to 
willing, Lonergan’s work provides a basis for a conception of 
engineering that gives due recognition to its ethical character and to 
the need for engineering virtues. This knowing-based view of 
engineering, focused on ‘engineering insight,’ provides the basis for a 
core, discipline-neutral approach to engineering. It proposes an 
engineering education centered on norms inherent to the knowing 
process, specifically attentiveness and intentionality. These norms in 
turn provide a source for defining and developing engineering virtues 
and character. 
INTRODUCTION 
The philosophy of engineering is a developing 
field, and constitutes a difficult 
challenge.(Goldman, 2004). At its heart, the 
polyparadigmatic and hybrid nature of engineering 
poses a challenge to understanding of engineering. 
An engineer often uses the knowledge and 
techniques of any number of arts and disciplines in 
solving engineering problems and requires 
creativity to give existence to that which has ‘never 
been.’ As such, engineering is a discipline that is 
searching for an identity, an identity to help address 
the breadth and depth of the educational experience 
needed to reach what is required at a bachelor or 
master’s level. (Grimson, 2014) Hence, 
explorations into the philosophy of engineering can 
be of significant value to the engineer, to the 
engineering educator and to the philosopher 
interested in the question of “What is engineering?” 
Philosophy as a whole, and epistemology in 
particular is about asking fundamental questions 
(Schmidt, 2013), including questions about 
engineering in which we are looking for a unity 
behind the diversity presented to us by 
contemporary culture. Many valuable treatments of 
engineering philosophy specifically aim to 
distinguish engineering from science. (Floorman, 
1987; Vincente, 1990; Bassett, 2014), or from art 
(Bucciarelli, 2003; Cross, 2007).  
One of the key challenges to Philosophy in the 
Post-Modern era is the challenge of addressing the 
overall problems of truth and value in the face of 
relativism; the challenge is to look for the 
universal, if indeed it exists: are there exigent 
patterns for correct knowing in the face of 
subjectivity? The present work leans on particular 
developments in epistemology applied to the 
philosophy of engineering. In particular is the 
seminal work of Bernard Lonergan, Insight first 
published in 1957. (Lonergan B. , 1992) For 
Lonergan and philosophers following his lead, the 
assertion is that in fact we can discover the 
possibility and limits of human knowing, that in 
knowing we discover the criteria for correct 
knowing. (Cronin, 2010) This challenge is 
addressed not by epistemological theories, but 
rather by exploring the data, the experience of 
human knowing; knowing in the context of 
subjectivity, with reasonable probability, ways that 
provide an integrating framework that is 
transcultural and applicable beyond the pluralism 
of cultures. The core of this work centers on the 
concept of insight, and the foundational text of that 
same name (Lonergan B. , 1992) holds that “we 
come to know about the activity of understanding 
by adverting to what we do when we understand 
something correctly.” (Cronin, 2010)  
 “By insight, then, is meant not any act of 
attention or advertence or memory, but the 
supervening act of understanding… its function 
in cognitional activity is so central that to grasp 
it in its conditions, its working, and its results is 
to confer a basic yet startling unity on the whole 
field of human inquiry and human opinion.” 
(Lonergan B. , 1992, p. ix)  
This unity in the field of inquiry, indeed in the field 
of epistemology as a whole, is one of the central 
achievements offered by Lonergan. The point of 
his Insight is to discover the possibility and limits 
of human knowing from within the process. 
(Cronin, 2010) This work proposes the philosophy 
of consciousness method developed in Insight as a 
means for distinguishing Engineering from the 
polyparadigmatic arts and sciences often used in 
engineering.   
INSIGHT AND THE METHOD OF THE HUMAN MIND 
Lonergan’s work provides a solid foundation for 
investigating the various methods of knowing used 
in engineering.  It does so by tracing all forms of 
knowing -- from everyday common-sense to the 
most specialized pure science -- back to a common 
underlying method which he calls the “procedures 
of the human mind”(Lonergan, 1992, p 4.) This 
procedure or method is discoverable by 
“interiority analysis,” by a concrete investigation 
of the operations of knowing and the relationships 
among these operations. This investigation is made 
possible by a dual presence in knowing – of things 
to ourselves and of ourselves to ourselves. Because 
each of us is a knower and because each of us is at 
least tacitly aware of our operations of knowing, 
we can test Lonergan’s account against our own 
knowing to see if it is consistent. What he 
challenges us to is a personal and collective 
investigation into the operations of our own 
knowing, with an end being the self-appropriation 
of our knowing (Lonergan, 1992, pp 14 – 17). The 
result is a consistent, general template for all 
knowing, and in his observation, one that is 
tailored differently for specialized forms of 
knowing.  
 
Beginning with the concept of insight, Lonergan 
focuses much of his work on the question, “what 
do I myself do when I come to know?” In his 
answer, Lonergan develops the method of the 
human mind, around three central operations: 
experiencing, understanding, and judging. He 
argues that this method underlies all specialized 
forms of knowing.  This basic heuristic method is 
tailored in various ways to meet the particular 
requirements of everyday life, as well as the 
specialized contexts of mathematical and empirical 
science. (Lonergan, 1992). In the method of the 
human mind, the emphasis is on the individual 
thinking – the data of the exploration is within the 
subject doing the thinking. Thus the individual, in 
their subjective context, the one experiencing 
provides us with the data for the inquiry. (Cronin, 
2010) Consequently, this is a theory of cognition 
centered in an exploration into the conditions for 
insight that relies upon adherence to a norm of 
attentiveness, to our striving to make sense of the 
data. Questions about our thinking about an 
experience of some object (e.g., “What is it?), 
promotes us from experiencing to attempts to 
understand; Experiencing and understanding are 
two distinct activities.  Understanding, then, is to 
find the form, pattern, meaning, or significance of 
what we have experienced or observed. These 
intelligible forms are the fruit of successful inquiry, 
where inquiry (questioning) and imagination yield 
insights, which are then expressed in concepts and 
definitions to provide a formulation of the 
understanding attained.  
Lonergan begins his inquiry with the question 
“what am I doing when I am knowing?”  His 
answer is that the knower is doing several things – 
experiencing, understanding and judging. To know 
requires each of these operations and in the proper 
relation. Experiencing provides the data, in which 
understanding discovers an intelligibility or form.  
The intelligibility or form discovered then needs to 
be judged in the light of the data before it can be 
affirmed or denied as really so, as warranted by 
sufficient evidence. Without an understanding 
there would be nothing to judge and, without 
experiencing, nothing to understand. Without 
understanding, experiencing lacks intelligibility 
and, without judging, understanding is not yet 
distinguished from misunderstanding. The 
operations are functionally complementary: they 
complete and perfect each other. Each is 
characterized by intentionality, by being directed 
toward being and truth. The impetus they give us 
toward reality may be thematized in two questions 
– in the query “what is it?” explicitly or tacitly 
raised about the data of experience and so leading 
toward understanding, and in the query “is it really 
so?” raised about our understanding and so leading 
us on to judgment. Only when both of these 
questions have been properly answered have we 
acquired knowledge.  
 
In reflecting on these operations, Lonergan’s 
position is that we find norms built into them that 
set standards for successful knowing. Others have 
termed Lonergan’s formulation of these norms his 
“be-attitudes”: “be attentive, be intelligent, be 
reasonable, be responsible.” (Dunne, 1995, p. 6)  
To notice or experience what is going on, we must 
pay attention. Disconnecting monitoring 
equipment or avoiding inspections, yields a lack of 
data that might reveal pending malfunctions. 
Understanding the data, requires exercise of our 
intelligence by searching for patterns. Collecting 
data without analyzing it will never yield 
understanding.  Similarly, if we are not reasonable 
in judging some understanding in the light of the 
evidence, we will not be able to distinguish 
understandings from misunderstandings or fact 
from fantasy. That is why in court trials we insist 
on proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” on 
judgments warranted by the evidence to such an 
extent that there is no other reasonable conclusion. 
At the ethical level of knowing, which will be 
considered below, we must “be responsible” by 
willing consistently with our knowing.        
 
A Objective Knowing 
As a theory of cognition rooted in self-
appropriation, the question remains as to how 
these operations of the mind can yield objective 
knowledge of reality. This opens the question of 
objectivity, and how the operations of knowing 
relate to objectivity.  Lonergan argues that these 
operations of experiencing, understanding and 
judgment can do this, in part, because of the 
intentionality of the subject, and a resulting 
relation and engagement of the knower with the 
known. This engagement varies from experiencing 
to understanding to judging and, as a result, 
Lonergan contends that objectivity has three 
interdependent aspects: Experiential, referring to 
the objectivity of givenness, Normative, referring 
to understanding beyond the subjectivity of our 
feelings and fears and Absolute, referring to the 
judgment of something being so, and (Lonergan, 
1992, pp 402 – 407).  
 
Grasping the objectivity of givenness is part of our 
knowing from our experience. What is present to 
us in experience, when one is attentive to the data, 
is the realization that the data in front of us sets 
objective limits to possible understandings and 
judgments. Recognizing that limitation is the first 
step toward objectivity. Conversely, if the would-
be knower is inattentive, the data set will be 
insufficient for understanding the relevant reality. 
Data by itself is not reality because, as data, it is 
still lacking the form or pattern (or order) that is 
part of the reality of the object. Our intelligence is 
needed to discover form and the crucial moment in 
the discovery of this form is an instant of insight. 
With insight, we discover the possible source of an 
oscillation, the possible fit of a curve, the possible 
relationship to a part of a problem or potential 
solution. Unfortunately, as Lonergan says, insights 
are “a dime a dozen” and are often mistaken. 
Forms may be partly imagined as when we too 
hastily recognize a familiar pattern that is not quite 
present. However, because insights uncover the 
possible order in reality, they are essential to the 
development of objective knowledge. Their 
objectivity depends on giving intelligence free rein 
by a thorough and penetrating search for patterns.  
 
However, to distinguish understandings from 
misunderstandings, another aspect of objectivity is 
required, what Lonergan terms its “absolute” 
aspect. In this aspect, we determine the conditions 
necessary for something to be so, e.g. for an 
accused person to be guilty “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” By examining our understanding, our 
hypothesis, in the light of the data, we can then 
conclude whether the necessary conditions for that 
conditioned judgment really being so have in fact 
been met. Lonergan calls this absolute aspect of 
objectivity reaching the “virtually unconditioned.”  
He uses that term to indicate that we have reached 
a condition where all of the subjectivity removed, 
a judgments whose conditions have been fulfilled. 
This gives us the “absolute” aspect of objectivity 
because, with all conditions met, the conditioned 
has to be so. It is not a matter of what we wish or 
favor, but a matter of the relation of a conditioned 
to its condition(s). To the extent that we confine 
our judgments to this relation, they can be 
objective.  
 
Intertwined with the absolute and experiential 
aspects of objectivity is what Lonergan terms 
Normative Objectivity. This is the aspect of 
objectivity that steps beyond the subject, the aspect 
of objectivity that opposes the rash judgment, the 
wishful thinking – the rationality amidst irrational 
thoughts applied to understanding something. It 
centers on the desire to understand, especially the 
desire to understand unconditionally exclusive of 
feelings and whims, to sort out the relationships 
and interconnectedness among possibilities. This 
normative objectivity is an aspect of our process of 
understanding that distinguishes among 
sound/meaningful and unsound/meaningless 
questions. At its best, normative objectivity strives 
to be rational in the formulation of understanding – 
not to be driven by belief or propaganda, or one’s 
insecure resentments or even the trends of what 
passes for acceptable in one’s culture. Rather, 
normative objectivity seeks that which is 
normative – the desire to know, the desire to base 
one’s understanding of an object by means 
normalized against the whims of the subject 
seeking understanding. These aspects of 
objectivity: absolute, normative, and experiential 
all support our processing of insights into things 
that are known. 
 
B Patterns of Knowing 
Lonergan’s theory of cognition centers around 
experiencing, understanding and judging, 
recognizing the roles of absolute, normative and 
experiential aspects of objectivity. The questions 
remain about just how we, as we try to self-
appropriate how we know, are supposed to reach 
objective knowledge or what, in general 
epistemological terms, is referred to as justified 
true belief. Self-appropriation asks that we 
examine questions central to the process of 
knowing such as: “Where do the conditions that 
have to be met to reach the virtually unconditioned 
come from?” “Who decides what they are and 
when they are met, and how do they decide?” 
When we achieve an insight into some data, we 
discover a pattern and we arrive at an 
understanding. That discovery can be facilitated by 
good imagery, by careful observation and analysis, 
by having in mind a variety of patterns 
characteristic in such situations.  In the end, 
though, insights require a creative synthesis of 
elements of the data, in particular if we are 
attentive to the various aspects of objectivity.  Is 
that understanding correct?  It will be if all the 
conditions required for it to be so are met. But how 
are those conditions to be discovered? Here, again, 
we need experiencing, understanding, and judging. 
This pattern of knowing is not circular but rather is 
cumulative. 
 
An example of this pattern (Fitzpatrick, 2011) can 
illustrate how we can self-appropriate our 
knowing. Assume you go into a room in the upper 
story of your house.  Your eye sweeps over a dark 
patch on the carpet, one that was not there before – 
an experience that provides data. Seeking 
understanding, you wonder what it is and why it is 
there. You put a finger on it, examine a drop, 
notice its silvery texture, and conclude it is water, 
but water from where? More data gleaned from 
experience enhances the experiential aspects of 
your understanding. You begin thinking of 
possible causes that could explain the presence of 
the water. Were the wash basin along the wall to 
have over-flowed, water might have run over and 
caused the spot. Similarly, a radiator leak could be 
responsible, or possibly a leak from the pipe under 
the floor. Each of these possible explanations of 
the data represents an insight and an 
understanding. Which is correct?  Recognizing and 
stepping beyond my annoyance of the last radiator 
leak allows me to normalize my exploration.  
 
In seeking objectivity, your mind considers the 
conditions that would have to be met for each to be 
true and is able to discount each.  The tap in the 
wash basin is turned off and the sink appears dry 
and has not been used for a long time. The side of 
the radiator is dry. The pipe under the floor would 
more likely leak down.  At this point, something 
strikes you on the head and you feel it with your 
finger and look up.  It is water, there is a spot on 
the ceiling, and rain can be heard on the flat roof. 
There is sufficient evidence for a highly probable 
judgment that the roof is leaking. You were able to 
establish the conditions that would have to be met 
for explanations of the spot to be true.  You do this 
by applying what you know about the properties of 
water, about usage of the basin, about the sound of 
rain on the roof, etc.  
 
Here we see the importance of what Lonergan 
calls the scissors-action in knowing. We move up 
from the data and down from general patterns 
learned through education and work in the area.  
These actions work through applying different 
absolute, normative and experiential aspects of 
translating the subjective experiences into 
objective knowledge. This implies, and Lonergan 
suggests, that there are in fact significant patterns 
to how people pattern knowing. The scientist may, 
for example, have a familiar set of differential 
equations in mind ready to be applied to reveal 
patterns in the data.  Similarly, an engineer’s 
education and practical experience will make him 
or her familiar with an abundance of patterns of 
data and of relations of causality and dependence – 
and these patterns can be brought to bear both in 
achieving insights and in establishing the 
conditions that must be met for something really to 
be so.  
 
Each of these particular patterns of investigation 
set up types of knowing, such as classical, 
scientific, or statistical knowing, which are 
specializations of the general method of the human 
mind. These specific heuristic methods to support 
knowing are reasonable and proper to each 
discipline. (Cronin, 2010) A particularly 
interesting expression of these heuristics is the 
empirical methods proper to the modern 
understanding of natural science. These include the 
application of classical and statistical laws as they 
are understood by the individual, developed into 
theory, and adopted by the community. The key 
point here is that the various forms of scientific 
knowing are demonstrated to be examples of the 
same underlying method of the mind as common 
sense knowing. However, the tailoring of methods 
to the objects under study sets up the expectations 
for different patterns of knowing, that serve 
different purposes in human society, and the 
expectation that such patterns, or meta-patterns of 
knowing have developed, and will continue to 
develop. Lonergan documents sets of these meta-
patterns of knowing for the empirical sciences, and 
comments on their limits: “Pure science aims 
immediately at reaching the immanent 
intelligibility of data and leaves to applied science 
the categories of final, material, instrumental, and 
efficient causality.” A fascinating characteristic of 
engineering is its practical and instrumental nature, 
which gives it an intermediate position between 
the empirical sciences and common sense: As a 
discipline, and a way of approaching developing 
artifacts of value it necessarily draws on both 
forms of knowing. However, in showing how both 
scientific and common sense knowing are 
specialized forms of the underlying method of the 
mind, Lonergan provides a basis for a unified view 
of these disciplines, with their varied procedures 
(Lonergan, 1992, pp 244- 253). 
 
This general method of the human mind is the 
most important heuristic (Greek heurisko, to find 
or discover) method. In applying it in different 
contexts, in everyday life, in physics, in 
engineering, we tailor it to the needs of the field. 
Because of the complexity of engineering, a 
variety of tailored versions are utilized. Sometimes 
engineering needs scientific precision, sometimes 
something close to the “good enough“ standard of 
common sense will do. In determining the flight 
path for a planetary exploration vehicle, great 
precision is required. The mission will be 
expensive, not easily repeated, and with little 
margin for error. The experiencing in the process 
of experiencing, understanding, and judging will 
need to be carefully controlled to avoid distorting 
factors and noise. Our understanding will need to 
be comprehensive and precise and will need to 
view things in relation to each other rather than 
simply to ourselves. Judgment will require a very 
high degree of certainty, based on precise and 
exhaustive data, to ensure all conditions for a 
particular trajectory are met.  
 
In everyday common-sense knowing, our 
requirements are far different. Because common 
sense knowledge is for living and because we live 
in the here and now, common sense does not seek 
universal truths. Its practical purpose requires 
prompt action, meaning any precision beyond what 
is “good enough” is a waste of precious time. 
Similarly, common sense has no time for defining 
its terms or for developing a technical vocabulary, 
if everyday speech is workable. It prefers 
descriptive to explanatory definitions, terms based 
on how things appear rather than terms indicating 
the relation of things to other things in some order 
or scheme.  Thus, “dutchman’s breech’s” is what 
common sense would call the plant dicentra 
cucullaria. These terms carry with them the weight 
of social construction and agreement, but also of 
what has become ‘known’ by the community, and 
when used correctly, the individual. 
 
We often need to act quickly, in a simple context, 
where actions taken according to well-known rules 
of thumb may be enough. At such times, our 
experiencing need not be confined to controlled 
experiments.  A general view of the situation may 
be sufficient.  Our understanding may need only to 
discover which rule of thumb seems to fit the data 
best.  Our judgments may require not near 
certainty, but only moderate probability. These are 
some of the ways in which experiencing, 
understanding, and judging may be tailored. There 
are countless others. For example, various fields of 
engineering will have widely differing methods of 
data-collection.  Each serves a tailored version of 
experiencing, understanding and judging.   
 
C Insight 
This theory of cognition presented in Insight posits 
that we can generate ideas out of the images 
derived from our senses, and those of our 
imagination. This implies a structure in the mind 
that enables one to move from images, from the 
sensible to the intelligible, from the unknown to the 
known, giving direction to our searching. This is 
not a random insight, but rather guided by the 
activities of experiencing, inquiry and 
understanding. But these are purposeful activities: 
the aim of the questions, of the inquiry is the 
understanding reached from the achievement of 
insight. (Cronin, 2010) 
In Lonergan’s terms, inquiry, insight and 
formulation embody a norm of intelligence, a 
general and generalizable set of guidelines that 
orient our search for understandings. Because 
understandings may be misunderstandings, we 
cannot stop with inquiry, insight or initial 
formulations, but must go on to ask the critical 
question, “is it really so?” which is particularly 
important in the context of conflicting data. The 
process of answering this question thematizes our 
desire to move through critical reflection to 
judgment. Judging marshals and weighs the 
evidence to assess the adequacy of our 
understanding. The evidence is adequate if it shows 
that the conditions necessary for something's being 
so are all met. If they are met, within the context 
our knowing reaches a “virtually unconditioned” 
state, whose conditions for justified belief are 
fulfilled. It is no longer is conditional and, until 
proven otherwise, must be true.  
The norm embodied in these operations of judging 
is that of reasonableness. The overall method is 
adjusted based on the perceived need for 
timeliness, precision, comprehensiveness, 
universality, and/or completeness. (Lonergan B. , 
1992). This is where the viewpoint of knowledge is 
critical, as individual need or use for the 
proposition and the social context affect the manner 
in which something is known. 
This movement to the known begins with a 
question, or inquiry that is a combination of that 
which is known and that which is unknown. Hence 
the formulation of the question(s), naming that 
which is unknown is essential. Similarly, the 
second step is to sort out and relate knowns and 
unknowns, what can be, or needs to be known, and 
how these might be known. This struggle requires 
exploring the knowns and unknowns, the 
conflicting data, and setting up the conditions for 
insight. Here solution patterns, or formula – the 
theories related to the particular data become 
useful, and can be good guides for reasonable 
conclusions. This process of moving to the known, 
is referred to as common sense knowing, a “modest 
and secure undertaking… to understand things in 
their relation to us” (Lonergan, 1992, p 232)   
In brief summary, the work of Insight makes the 
case for a reliable method of the human mind 
developed from carefully examining the 
consciousness of the human knower. His theory of 
cognition employs a tripartite focus on experience, 
understanding and judgment, where humans 
routinely use multiple and different heuristics for 
aiding the transformation of the unknown to the 
known. It examines the creative, inquisitive 
conditions for an insight, the volitional, intertwined 
series of cognitive states that move the knower 
from experience and inquiry to understanding and 
judgment. Further, these heuristics are both 
individual, and communal, with the establishment 
of various canons, or patterns that are normatively 
socially and culturally located. Further, these 
heuristics or patterns of knowing are expected to be 
developed over time, as the need for different types 
of insights changes. 
ENGINEERING INSIGHT 
Lonergan’s cognitional theory is proposed as a 
norm of intelligence, unique to humans; and sets up 
the possibility that patterns for engineering thinking 
may be established. Lonergan uses a set of six 
‘Canons of Empirical Method’ to illustrate his 
exploration – “insight into the nature of insight.” 
These canons of selection, operations, relevance, 
parsimony, complete explanation and statistical 
residues are used illustrate how his cognitional 
theory maps to specific modes of thinking common 
to scientific practice. The Canon of Selection, for 
example is the notion that the inquirer is confined 
to insights into the data of sensible experience. This 
canon differs from that of operation, wherein the 
enquirer collects and systematizes from the insights 
of selection. These result in cumulative verification 
with the resulting refinement and accuracy of the 
lessons of selection. When working with well-
understood data, desirable higher viewpoints are 
achieved by expanding, constructing, analyzing and 
constant checking (Lonergan, 1992, pp 91 – 99). 
While this ‘canon of observation’ is clearly a key 
component to engineering knowing, it would be 
incomplete to consider it as the whole. 
Engineering purposefully addresses the “final, 
material, instrumental, and efficient causality” 
through the application of pragmatic values 
embodied in methods and directed by purpose to 
achieve the desired causality through the 
identification of human needs and desires, and the 
creation of suitable artifacts that meet human 
needs. Certainly these insights include those 
discipline-specific heuristics related to the 
development of effective artifacts. However, this 
understanding of ‘engineering insight’ includes 
discovering the complexities of the context(s) – 
where the human needs and desires are located, and 
drive the value proposition of the effort. It includes 
recognizing that these context(s) may only be 
known by the engineer through their exploration of 
the problem/opportunities with others.  
Engineering, at its foundations is ‘both’ using the 
hard and soft sciences and mathematics ‘and’ 
pragmatic, and more than both: it is about 
generating and using knowledge for a purpose and 
with a method that is more than theory, more than 
descriptive: it is useful, and the usefulness is never 
ideal, but rather located within a context, and 
significantly social in its application. (Frezza, 
2014). This concept is labeled a ‘pragmatic theory’ 
of knowledge, which in Lonergan’s terms might be 
described as an ‘Engineering Design Canon’. This 
distinction in knowledge generation is both 
individual and social; it affects the use of the 
knowledge, and shapes the manner in which it is 
generated (Frezza, Norqduest, & Moodey, 2013), 
and builds on the cannons of observation and 
statistical residues that Lonergan proposed. In a 
sense, the cognitional theory presented in Insight 
suggests a particular engineering insight that 
extends beyond Lonergan’s Canons, and provides a 
unifying sense of engineering knowing that draws 
together many of the components of engineering 
philosophy present in the literature. 
For example, the value of usefulness as a 
distinguishing factor (Frezza, 2014) is significant, 
and drives the engineering knowing process 
differently from that of the canon of operations 
alone. This suggests that engineering activities may 
best be viewed by a set of values (pragmatic use), 
which are necessarily located in a context, and 
exploring the context is part of the engineering 
activity. The role that context plays is significant, 
because from a knowledge perspective, context 
includes sociological expectations, domain-specific 
patterns and problem-specific knowledge that 
either, must be brought, learned or synthesized as 
part of the engineering activity. These are patterns 
of knowing, patterns for developing engineering 
insight. These patterns of knowing are embodied in 
the images derived from our senses, shared in the 
models and language of the design (Bucciarelli, 
2003), and necessarily include patterns of 
questioning (Gause & Weinberg, 1999) and 
development of argument (Kallenberg, 2013) for 
the individual and collective understanding both of 
the problem and solution (Smithers, 1992). These 
are patterns of knowing which are necessarily 
heuristic and go beyond traditional patterns of 
science, art or applied science (Koen, 2013). A 
challenge to understanding these patterns of 
engineering knowing is distinguishing knowing 
from that of willing (Schmidt, 2013).   
KNOWING AND WILLING 
With the “method of the human mind,” Lonergan 
offers a shared foundation for the varied methods 
of knowing employed by engineers. Each is a 
version of the basic underlying method of knowing, 
but tailored to fit particular materials and contexts. 
However, the unity Lonergan helps us discover in 
engineers’ knowing may appear overshadowed by 
a more fundamental diversity between their 
knowing and their willing. One distinguishing 
viewpoint on engineering emphasizes willing 
above knowing. “Engineering… seeks to know in 
order to make.” (Sich, 2014, p. 45) From this 
perspective, engineering is can be considered more 
a matter of art and skill in applying knowledge and, 
therefore, more of willing than of knowing. This 
viewpoint emphasizes a disjunction between 
volition and intellect, making choices instead of 
adopting beliefs, motives rather than reasons, 
deciding rather than judging, and being responsible 
more than being reasonable. Engineering in this 
context would appear a captive enterprise, subject 
to a variety of intellectual and social limits, which 
frequently place market and organizational needs 
above technical considerations, and as a result 
“instrumental in nature.” (Schmidt, 2013, p. 107)  
This instrumental perspective is consistent with 
others emphasizing the heuristic design procedures 
of engineers. (Koen, 2003) From this perspective, 
the same heuristics may lead to a variety of suitable 
designs and different heuristics to similar designs. 
The design procedure appears to be more a matter 
of art and will than of knowledge, with 
“intentionality” a better descriptor of the 
engineering process than “rationality.” At its heart, 
designing in the face of constraints, legal 
restrictions, political considerations, and technical 
tradeoffs has “no rigid and inerrant formula that 
will provide the 'proper' outcome" for such designs. 
(Schmidt, 2013, p. 108) Design decisions are not 
deductive but inductive: thus from the 
instrumentalist perspective, engineers reach 
conclusions that are not certain, relying on tacit 
knowledge, and are more a matter of the artist's 
sense of fit than of science.  
Although consistent with these and others 
perspectives, the instrumental perspective remains 
incomplete. Willing and knowing are part of a 
continuous process, and viewing an enterprise like 
engineering as either willing or knowing, (or more 
willing than knowing) ignores this continuity. The 
instrumental perspective that emphasizes willing is 
an important and challenging contribution to our 
understanding of engineering insight.  It can be 
developed by drawing more fully on Lonergan's 
account of willing, as well as on his treatments of 
common sense, the modern understanding of 
science, and the importance of feelings and 
authenticity in deliberating and deciding on values. 
In this knowing-based approach to the philosophy 
of knowledge, Lonergan argues for more continuity 
between knowing and willing, for a greater 
contribution from common sense thinking, for the 
importance of feelings as sensitizing us to value, 
and for the fundamental importance of authenticity.  
In Insight Lonergan argues that “[m]an is not only 
a knower but also a doer; the same intelligent and 
rational consciousness grounds the doing as well 
as the knowing; and from that identity of 
consciousness there springs inevitably an exigence 
for self-consistency in knowing and doing” 
(Lonergan B. , 1992, p. 622). This exigence for 
self-consistency leads Lonergan to reject  a “faculty 
psychology” consisting of separate faculties of “the 
intellect,” “the judgment,” and “the will,” Rather, 
there are interrelated operations of a unified mind. 
In this sense of “the will” not separate unto itself, 
but rather a part of a whole that focuses on 
authenticity (self-consistency) in decision-making: 
“It is this highly complex business of authenticity 
and unauthenticity that has to replace the overly 
simple notion of will as arbitrary power. 
Arbitrariness is just another name for 
unauthenticity. To think of will as arbitrary power 
is to assume that authenticity never exists or 
occurs” (Lonergan, 1973, pp 121 - 122). Hence for 
Lonergan, the authenticity at stake is the 
consistency between our knowing and our 
deciding.  
A Authenticity in knowing and willing 
Willing shows its continuity with knowing by 
situating the object of willing in a “good of order” 
wherein through our decisions we recognize not 
only a particular good, but also an increasingly 
complex good. In this view, simple acts of 
consumption, prompted by hunger or thirst are not 
true acts of willing. Such actions are more on the 
level of animal life. True willing requires reference 
to “an intelligible good,” one in which “objects of 
appetite are subsumed or placed within some 
apprehension of a good of order.” A meal is a 
particular good, while something like the “Meals 
on Wheels” program that serves the elderly 
establishes a complex good of order.  It is in these 
various levels of the good of order that the 
authenticity of willing is found. 
The will viewed in the context of order implies that 
logic has an important role to play in authentic 
willing. Lonergan argues that you cannot 
responsibly will an antecedent without willing the 
known consequent or choose the part while 
rejecting the whole or choose the conditioned while 
repudiating its condition (Lonergan, 1992, p 632). 
Authentic willing, viewed in the context of a good 
of order, flows from its “intellectual antecedents.” 
These antecedents are identified as "the sensitive 
flow, the practical insight, the process of reflection 
that lead to the decision.” (Lonergan B. , Collected 
Works, 1992, p. 632)  
• Sensitive flow is the experience inquired 
into and consists of our various conscious 
sensations, imaginings, feelings, and 
bodily movements.  Authenticity at this 
stage requires attentiveness, without which 
we would lack sufficient data to move on 
to an understanding of problems and 
possibilities.  
• Practical insight reveals ways in which the 
world is subject to being altered. Practical 
insights are similar to factual ones in that 
both seek intelligible unities or 
correlations. However, factual insights 
address whether patterns are present and 
practical insights whether they might be 
made to be present. Engineering education 
teaches a variety of typical situations and 
transformations and engineers will 
normally search the data to see if standard 
patterns might fit or if new ones are 
discernable. Authenticity at this level 
requires intelligence – inquiry, insight, and 
apt formulation.  
• Reflection and judgment is where we 
affirm or deny the existence or possibility 
of some ordering. For Lonergan, practical 
judgments are highly complex, dealing 
with the object of the act, our motives for 
it, its consistency with the accepted order 
or its contribution to improving that order, 
as well as with the intelligence and 
reasonableness present in the agent 
intending such an action. The last factor 
shifts attention from the action as object 
(rational consciousness) to the actor as 
subject (rational self-consciousness.)  As 
with factual judgments, the norm for 
authenticity here is reasonableness. 
These intellectual antecedants to willing are not 
entirely rational, but their authenticity is framed by 
logic and practical reason. At the root of the 
continuity and consistency between our knowing 
and willing is thus one’s internal sense of the good, 
and our freedom to choose the good (e.g., 
character/virtue). Authentic willing consistent with 
knowing flows from applying these antecedents, 
setting the stage responsible decisions.  This 
analysis has important implications for engineering 
education, one of whose tasks it is to teach 
engineering virtues and, thus, authenticity. 
B Willing and deciding 
The fourth element in Lonergan's account of 
willing is decision, which puts an end to 
deliberation by consenting or declining to enact a 
course of action vetted by practical reflection. In 
the process of deciding, we put an end to 
deliberation by enacting or refusing to enact a 
course of action vetted by practical reflection. That 
a decision is needed to end practical reflection and 
to act may seem to lend support to the instrumental 
view that engineering is more about willing than 
knowing. However, Lonergan would disagree, 
comparing decisions to factual judgments and 
argues both “are rational, for both deal with 
objects apprehended by insight, and both occur 
because of a reflective grasp of reasons.” 
(Lonergan B. , Collected Works, 1992, p. 636) 
Judging, he maintains, involves an “unfolding of 
the detached and disinterested desire to know,” 
while rationality of decision-making “emerges in 
the demand of the rationally conscious subject for 
consistency between his knowing and his deciding 
and doing.” Rational decision-making is hardly just 
instrumental, rather it is ranked by its consistency 
with knowing. 
A different challenge to the continuity of knowing 
and deciding is the argument that the "staggering 
array of variables that influence what is ultimately 
constructed" makes a deductive, purely rational 
decision atypical. (Schmidt, 2013) The multitude of 
variables in the context of engineering decision-
making are similar to those forming the context in 
which common sense operates. Precisely because 
of the impossibility of perfect knowledge and 
unlimited time for deciding in everyday life, we 
develop various rules of thumb and examples to 
guide us and then rely on additional insights into 
the situation to determine which rules of thumb 
best apply to our present context. Lonergan would 
not see this as in any way non-rational. Similarly, 
in determining which engineering solution best fits 
the "staggering array of variables," insight is 
required and its adequacy can be assessed by 
reference to the data, integrated with heuristics both 
of inquiry and the state of the art, leading to 
individual and collective understanding of the 
problem and potential solutions. This is the heart of 
engineering insight.  
Becoming an engineer requires transforming 
oneself through "a laborious process to acquire 
mastery" (Lonergan, 1992, p 621). That mastery 
involves a habitual willingness to move beyond 
recognition of problems and practical possibilities, 
and to move to effective acts of willing that 
transform the environment by realizing some good 
apprehended as part of an intelligible order. Thus, 
authentic willing is impossible apart from an 
intellectual grasp of order, as knowing and 
authentic willing are inseparable. In engineering 
knowing, this significantly implies the formation 
of, and formulation of a “good of order” that 
informs knowing and decision making. This 
perspective suggests that engineering knowing 
embodies a virtue of authenticity in the agent 
realized in the consistency of reasonableness.  This 
assertion, while useful, still leaves open the 
question of what distinguishes engineering 
knowing from the various forms of common sense 
knowing. 
DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF 
ENGINEERING KNOWING  
In examining distinctions in engineering knowing, 
what are of interest are distinguishing 
characteristics that lead to engineering insight - the 
experiencing, understanding and judging typical of 
core engineering activity, where engineering 
insight is recorded and acted upon: design. 
"Design" in this context denotes both the content 
of a set of plans (as in "the design for a new 
airplane") and the process by which those plans are 
produced. In the latter meaning, it typically begins 
with questioning to understand the context of the 
problem or opportunity for which some new object 
is wanted. This inquiry typically involves tentative 
sketches of what is understood – and what has 
been observed and or committed to in some form 
of layout (or layouts), expressed in some language 
(abstract, natural, or visual) of the arrangement and 
dimensions (properties) of the object. These 
tentative layouts are both part of the ‘experiencing’ 
of the engineering method, but also represent 
partial understandings which are then subject to 
judgment: checking of the candidate object by 
mathematical analysis or experimental test to 
judge the results, and lead to a decision. If judged 
insufficient, then the design is modified in ways to 
better achieve the goal.  This is a process of 
refinement, subject to a rational understanding of 
the need for timeliness, precision, 
comprehensiveness, and/or completeness. 
Ultimately, the design effort is judged by its costs 
and results – the usefulness of the design and/or 
product. (Pitt, 2007; Vincente, 1990). Scientific 
and mathematical knowledge are used in design as 
means to an end, tools to approximate reality, to 
support analysis, insight and judgment and not an 
end in themselves. Distinguishing aspects of 
engineering knowing would include at least the 
following aspects: 
• Intentional questioning: design work always 
includes some social, economic, 
organizational, environmental, regulatory and 
even political context that requires inquiry into 
the nature of the problems and/or opportunities 
intended to be solved (Smithers, 1992). 
Consequently, questions that explore the 
requirements are fundamental to effective, 
reasonable design work. (Gause & Weinberg, 
1999) 
• Role of practical reasoning: fundamentally 
design is about the application of practical 
reasoning (Kallenberg, 2013, p19) that is about 
reasoning to support action. In this context, it 
is similar to ethical reasoning, where details 
are essential to reasoning, and the relevance of 
details is not necessarily obvious 
• Engineering use of math and science: is 
primarily as a means to an end, and includes 
the realization that math and science 
(ideal/empirical) are only approximations of 
reality (Kallenberg, p. 19). 
• Constructive: From a linguistic or goal 
perspective, engineering knowing differs from 
other knowing in the goal: It is always future-
focused, about how things ought to be. 
(Bucciarelli, 2003; Cross, 2007). Engineering 
knowing focuses on the description of a new 
object, system or process that did not but 
might exist. 
• Values and value claims: Another area that 
distinguishes design includes the discussion on 
how the inherent values embedded into 
engineering design. This can be thought of as 
its ‘ethical character.’ 
The immediate observation is that these 
characteristics of engineering knowing are not 
independently sufficient to distinguish engineering 
knowing from other types of knowing, but rather 
establish it as a hybrid or intermediate form 
drawing on both scientific and common sense 
styles of knowing.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR ENGINEERING PEDAGOGY 
Lonergan persuasively argues that there is a 
method of the human mind underlying all common 
sense and scientific knowing and that practical 
decisions are an extension of this method. 
Engineers employ different forms of common-
sense reasoning to a greater extent than scientists 
and artists. Their work builds on their experience, 
and is intentional, rooted in problem/opportunity-
based inquiry to expand the effectiveness of their 
experiencing. So in some sense the purpose of 
design education is not to create an artifact but 
rather to grow as an engineer. By virtue of the 
practical reasoning engineering students constantly 
and repeatedly devise satisfactory responses to 
context-dependent problems. This should be 
contrasted with the historical, socially-constructed 
view of engineering dominant in engineering 
education. If accepted, this implication strongly 
suggests that the focus of common or ‘core’ 
engineering should shift its common locus from 
applied technical or scientific knowledge to 
problem/opportunity-related inquiry coupled with 
practical reasoning and context-dependent problem 
solving. It significantly suggests that what we 
should call engineering is broader, and deeper in 
impact than what is identified by accrediting 
bodies whose guidelines are structured on the 
historical-social viewpoint.  
 
Lonergan’s examination of insight and this line of 
reasoning both suggest that there is a broader 
understanding of engineering as a way of thinking 
– encompassed in a discipline and set of activities 
that crosses national, accreditation, and institutional 
lines. For those leading engineering programs, 
particularly those that cover multiple engineering 
sub-disciplines, the implications are significant – 
Foundations in engineering go beyond discipline-
specific norms and are rooted in norms inherent in 
the knowing process itself: attentiveness, 
intelligence, reasonableness, responsibly 
(Lonergan, 1973; Schmidt, 2013). In this sense, 
engineering fundamentals are thus neither rooted in 
math and science nor in art but in the mind itself.   
The various engineering heuristics are derived from 
these norms. Advertence to the analogous character 
and common source of the heuristics may help the 
engineering educator trying to better optimize 
limited course or credit hours. It suggests a 
significant development of skills pertinent to both 
contextual and context-free methods of inquiry and 
effective design analysis. This should include 
foundations and practice with the argumentation 
and synthetic reasoning necessary for design, and 
the practical reasoning surrounding puzzle making 
and puzzle solving. For the engineering educator 
trying to better optimize limited course or credit 
hours, this suggests significant development of 
skills and affect surrounding contextual and 
context-free methods of inquiry, and effective 
design argumentation. (Frezza, 2014) 
Thus, this analysis of engineering insight has 
several implications for engineering pedagogy, 
particularly related to attentiveness, intentionality, 
engineering virtues and the ethical character of 
engineering:  
• Attentiveness to Knowing: Students 
should become aware of the operations of 
their own minds as they confront and solve 
engineering problems or as they think 
through classic design successes (and 
failures).  Instructors can help them advert 
to the operations of experiencing, 
understanding, judging, and deliberating 
and deciding involved.  Lonergan explains 
the great value of such an approach in 
Insight: "Thoroughly understand what it is 
to understand and not only will you 
understand the broad lines of all there is to 
be understood but also you will possess a 
fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening 
upon all further developments of 
understanding."  
• Intentionality Analysis: Adverting to the 
underlying pattern of all knowing will help 
unify engineering pedagogy.  One of its 
basic problems is the diversity of 
techniques used at different points in the 
engineering process.  Sometimes the 
greatest rigor and precision is required, 
while at other times the "good enough" 
standard of common sense is sufficient. An 
intentionality analysis which adverts to the 
different ways the underlying method of 
the mind is applied can provide a much-
needed unity (Lonergan, 1992, p 392).  
• Engineering Virtues: Before engineering 
students can change their environment, 
they must change themselves.  The 
advertence to operations of the mind and to 
the norms built into these operations will 
assist students in grasping and acquiring 
what might be termed "engineering 
virtues," habits of knowing and deciding 
consistent with Lonergan's transcendental 
precepts -- "be attentive, be intelligent, be 
reasonable, be responsible." (Lonergan B. 
J., 1973) These norms of knowing and 
deciding provide an index of one's 
authenticity and, as applied to engineering, 
of one's professional authenticity.  
• Ethical Character: The approach to 
knowing presented above emphasizes the 
continuity between knowing and willing. 
Lonergan argues that we find within 
ourselves a demand for consistency 
between our knowing and our doing.  This 
is due to the need to will something as part 
of an intelligible order. Thus, one cannot 
consistently will the part, the conditioned, 
or the antecedent while repudiating the 
whole, condition, or consequent 
(Lonergan, 1992, p 625). The intentionality 
analysis offered by Lonergan provides a 
way of illuminating the ethical character of 
engineering. 
Engineering is about the application of practical 
reasoning, utilizing mathematics and science as a 
means, engaged in activities about how things 
ought to be - the constructive nature of designing 
(Cross, p. 24). Such a broad definition of 
engineering design resonates with, and extends 
work suggesting that there is significantly more to 
be learned in engineering that is not located within 
a particular discipline (Koen, 2003; Bucciarelli, 
2003; Cross, 2007). Most centrally, this work 
suggests that there is a body of applicable work in 
philosophy of engineering that is central to design 
education. At the undergraduate level, where most 
engineering students select a sub-discipline to 
specialize in, this implies that undergraduate 
engineering programs should emphasize of a 
common core to engineering emphasizing design 
and including intelligently emphasizing design 
reasoning. This could be a significant departure 
from the mathematics and science coursework 
common to most current programs.  Similarly, 
there is more opportunity for cross-disciplinary 
work that builds on, and reinforces the cognitive 
and affective aspects of ethical and design 
reasoning. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This work presents a very brief treatment of the 
philosophy of knowledge rooted in Bernard 
Lonergan’s seminal work, Insight. Lonergan 
distinguishes an underlying method of the human 
mind that is the source of the more specialized 
methods employed in the empirical and applied 
sciences and in the various developments of 
common sense. The polymorphic character of 
human knowing, operating in such varied contexts, 
suggests using a pragmatic theory of knowledge as 
a lens for examining the nature of engineering 
design as activities of knowing and willing. In 
accounting for specialized methods of knowing, 
tailored to the varied needs of knowers and subject 
matters, Lonergan's approach offers a knowing-
based approach with the flexibility needed for an 
epistemology of the many-sided activity of 
engineering. With his account of the basic method 
of the human mind underlying specialized methods, 
he also offers a basis for unifying the theory and 
pedagogy of engineering. Moreover, in carefully 
relating knowing to willing, Lonergan’s work 
provides a basis for a conception of engineering 
that gives due recognition to its ethical character 
and to the need for engineering virtues. 
This knowing-based view of engineering presents 
significant challenges for engineering educators. 
Over the mathematics- and science-dominant 
programs currently deployed, this re-definition of 
engineering focused on the development of 
‘engineering insight’ emphasizes the philosophy of 
design, provides the basis for a core, discipline-
neutral approach to engineering, proposing 
attentiveness, intentionality, engineering virtues 
and character at the center of engineering 
education. 
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Non Nova, Sed Nove Part I:   John Macmurray and Engineering Education 
 
Alan Cheville 
 
Introduction:  Why John Macmurray? 
This paper focuses on the life and life’s work of 
the rather obscure 20th century Scottish 
philosopher, John Macmurray, who while well-
known by many modern religious thinkers, is not 
widely recognized in academic philosophy circles.  
Despite his relative obscurity and work in natural 
theology Macmurray’s philosophy has great 
potential to inform reconceptions of engineering 
education. Macmurray was a systematic thinker 
who was interested in the broader application of 
philosophy to human society.  He developed 
philosophy based on thought being secondary, and 
in service to, action much in the way that some 
claim engineering instantiates the discoveries of 
science.     
 
To address the relevance of Macmurray’s work, 
this paper explores Macmurray’s life and outlines 
the major themes that emerge from one of his best 
known works, the two volume Gifford Lectures 
that represent his mature philosophy (Costello, 
2002).  This paper addresses only the first volume, 
The Self as Agent; the second will be addressed in 
a subsequent paper.  In the Gifford lectures 
Macmurray lays out many of the major ideas that 
were his life’s work, ideas that can better inform 
how we can educate engineers to face complex 
human challenges in the coming years.  Two 
questions form the basis of this inquiry into 
Macmurray’s work: 
1) How does Macmurray’s philosophical 
system align or conflict with the beliefs 
and values of engineering educators? 
2) What actionable ideas can engineering 
educators draw from Macmurray’s 
philosophy?  
These questions are addressed follow a discussion 
of The Self as Agent.  If one does believe engineers 
are aligned towards action, a close reading 
ofMacmurray indicates engineering education as 
practiced may be preparing students to serve as a 
means to someone else’s end.  
 
 
 
Brief Biography and Influences 
John Macmurrray was born in Scotland just before 
the start of 20th Century into a devoutly 
Presbyterian family; this religion likely influenced 
his systematic approach to philosophy.   As a 
young man Macmurray fought in the Great War 
where he served first in the medical corps and later 
on the front lines in a combat unit where he was 
severely wounded.  Following the war his resulting 
disillusionment with religious and secular society 
led him to question traditional methods and 
approaches.  While he remained deeply religious 
throughout his life, until his affiliation with the 
Society of Friends later in life he did not 
participate in organized religions.  An introvert by 
nature, his deep friendships with many leading 
thinkers of his day strongly influenced his 
philosophy.  These three elements—the base 
purpose of religion, the inhumanity of society, and 
friendship—were to form a very personal 
philosophy that had a strong influence on his 
professional work (Costello, 2002). 
 
After the war, Macmurray completed his degree 
and served in multiple senior academic positions 
throughout his life including Oxford, University 
College London, and finally the University of 
Edinburgh in 1944 where he stayed until his 
retirement in 1958.  He had a successful academic 
career, but did not publish in academic journals as 
much as he gave lectures, wrote books, and 
became a well-known and followed public figure 
through the first radio broadcasts on philosophy 
that he hosted for the BBC in the 1930’s and early 
1940’s (Hunt, 2001).  Throughout much of his life 
he was active politically in various aspects of the 
socialist and communist movements in Britain and 
an influential figure in many organizations from 
the Social Democrats to the Woodcraft Folk.  
Macmurray’s activism arose from his belief that 
the political movements of his time—fascism, 
communism, and corporate capitalism—did not 
adequately take human worth into account and his 
politics and philosophy critiqued the organic and 
mechanistic values that underlie these belief 
systems. 
It is difficult to classify Macmurray as a 
philosopher.  His work has a strong spiritual 
component, yet is based on rational rather than 
revelational claims.  His work is influenced both 
by the Christian religion but also by Kant and 
Marx.  He is often classified with the diffuse 
philosophical movement known as personalism 
which focuses on the uniqueness and dignity of 
individuals (Williams & Bengtsson, 2014).  He is 
also classified as a humanist and his major work 
clearly aligns with humanist views of human value 
and agency as well as a critical approach to 
religion.  Others classify Macmurray as an idealist 
since his view of humanity maintains that idealism 
is necessary as the basis of correct action.  Despite 
his relative obscurity in academic philosophy 
during his life there has recently been a 
Macmurray revival.  In 1996 the British politician 
Tony Blair wrote the introduction to The Personal 
World, the first collection of Macmurray’s selected 
works.  A recent special issue of the Oxford 
Review of Education focused on Macmurray 
(Fielding, 2002), and the John Macmurray 
Fellowship ("The John MacMurray Fellowship 
Website," 2014) supports occasional conferences 
focusing on his work. 
 
The Gifford Lectures 
The most comprehensive of Macmurray’s works 
are his Gifford Lectures given in 1952 and 1953 
and published as The Self as Agent (1957) and 
Persons in Relation (1961).  The Gifford Lectures, 
given at four Scottish schools—the universities of 
Edinburgh, Glasgow, St. Andrews and 
Aberdeen—are prestigious lectures on natural 
theology that have included a wide range of 
perspectives including those of William James, 
Alfred North Whitehead, Neils Bohr, Hanna 
Arendt, Karl Barth, and Carl Sagan.  Macmurray’s 
Gifford Lectures tie many threads of his work in 
philosophy together into one system and are the 
most comprehensive exposition of his philosophy 
(Costello, 2002).  In his Gifford Lectures 
Macmurray makes a broad systematic foray to 
develop a new form of philosophy that spans much 
of human experience.  The lectures broadly outline 
a tangent to rational, Western philosophy; 
Macmurray himself saw this work as an 
incomplete sketch rather than rigorous and 
complete.  His hope was other would follow and 
further develop his thoughts.  The tangent taken by 
Macmurray is the “form of the personal” which is 
distinguished from the form of logical 
(mechanical) or organic (romantic) thought 
addressed by many previous philosophers.  By 
developing the form of the personal Macmurray 
sought to extend the boundaries of scientific and 
rational thought to encompass human endeavors 
such as art and faith so they could stand on the 
same footing as rational thought.  Macmurray’s 
philosophy addresses what forms a “good life” for 
the individual or the Greek ideal of eudaemonia, 
“human flourishing”.  For Macmurray many of the 
ills of Western society could be placed at the feet 
of a philosophy that emphasized the rational and 
thus did not adequately address all aspects of what 
it means to be human.  The topic of eudaemonia is 
arguably of increasing importance to engineering 
educators; given the recent focus on branding 
engineering as a force for positive improvement in 
the world (Committee on Public Understanding of 
Engineering Messages, 2008) we should have a 
sense what should be improved and what 
“improvement” is.  A prerequisite of claiming that 
engineers work toward human flourishing is for 
engineers to have a defensible philosophical 
position on eudaemonia.  While the scope of 
Macmurray’s philosophy is broad, his emphasis on 
action above thought provides new insights for 
engineering education as discussed subsequently.     
 
In The Self as Agent Macmurray builds from a 
Western philosophical tradition that values 
individuals.  The basis of this work is the claim 
that a philosophy of the personal must start with a 
view of a person as an agent capable of action that 
creates change in the world rather than a rational, 
disembodied mind.    We are formed not from how 
we think, but from our actions that elicit a 
response both from the larger world and those who 
inhabit it.  This is close to the philosophies of 
Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel, both friends of 
Macmurray; of the three Macmurray tried to make 
sense of how the personal was to function as a 
philosophic system (Costello, 2002).  Macmurray 
builds his philosophy of the personal from Kant’s 
Critiques since he viewed the Critiques as the 
most adequate philosophy for tackling a range of 
problems related to resolving scientific, religious, 
and romantic thought.  In the Critiques Kant 
attempted to resolve major challenges of his time:  
the challenge to traditional (religious) authority 
created by Descartes; the failure of mechanical 
philosophy to account for emotional and religious 
aspects of human life; and the organic elements of 
romanticism.  Another reason Macmurray builds 
from Kant is that the Critiques form the basis for 
much subsequent Western philosophy and are thus 
a point to branch from in order to develop a 
philosophy that can guide a more humane society 
and tackle the challenges of the Contemporary 
period.  From his historical vantage point between 
the two World Wars, where he observed the rise of 
Fascism, Macmurray claimed that organic 
philosophies, which view the individual as part of 
a larger social organism, undermine human 
autonomy and freedom.    
 
Macmurray claims the keystone of Kant’s Critical 
Philosophy is the “thing-in-itself” or tension 
between the noumenal (ideal, actual, inferred 
through thought from sensory input) and 
phenomenal (experienced, known through the 
senses) worlds.  While the phenomenal world can 
be “known”, the noumenal cannot since our 
perception of the world is skewed to some degree 
by our senses and schemata.  Macmurray’s two 
major criticisms of Kant are:  1) that by failing to 
align the theoretical (noumenal) and practical 
(phenomenal) aspects of reason Kant creates an 
unbridgeable dualism, and 2) because of this 
dualism Kant’s philosophy fails to capture idealist 
aspects of human life.   Macmurray viewed this 
dualism as a key issue for modern society and 
human freedom due to his perception of a 
widening contradiction between science and 
morality.  This contradiction arises from 
Macmurray’s claim that moral choice relies upon 
individual freedom since one must be free to act in 
a way that is right.  However science and other 
mechanistic philosophies cannot guide such choice 
since they are ultimately deterministic, i.e. 
discover what already exists.  Macmurray 
summarizes this tension as “We can only know a 
determinate world; we can only act in an 
indeterminate world.”  Although purely practical 
(phenomenal) reason provides the ability to act in 
the world, by itself practical reason inevitably 
leads to totalitarianism since a society that 
imagines “the greater good” will develop ever-
better heuristics to achieve the envisioned end and 
work towards this goal both romantically and 
scientifically.  This single-minded focus on an 
ideal drives society towards determinism and 
eventually totalitarianism.  To allow individual 
freedom we must look to the noumenal world to 
determine “what is right to do”, yet Kant gives us 
no path to resolve the phenomenal and noumenal; 
i.e. to account for our schemata in order to act in a 
way that is right.   Macmurray saw the effects of 
this dualism acted out in the world in the rise of 
Nazi Germany. 
 
Macmurray claims that the phenomenal-noumenal 
and subject-object dualism inherent to modern 
philosophies that emerged from Kant arise from 
the viewpoint of humans as rational, disembodied 
minds.  To resolve this dualism Macmurray rejects 
Descartes’ cogito ergo sum “I think therefore I 
am” as egocentric, focusing on solely the “I” rather 
than the “You”.  In the second volume of his 
Gifford Lectures Macmurray shows that the 
egocentric viewpoint does not sufficiently value 
personal relationships that can allow right action to 
be known.  Macmurray was aware that from a 
historical perspective Descartes’ philosophy 
replaced (religious) authority with rationality, or a 
systematic process of doubt, as the basis for belief.  
While Macmurray values this rationality he claims 
that the isolated, egotistical nature of a 
disembodied mind can doubt too much with the 
practical effect of eliminating potential good from 
the world.  Macmurray conceives of humans as 
agents rather than thinkers, and the remainder of 
the Self as Agent develops a personal philosophy 
based on an isolated agent who has the ability to 
act to change the world as well as to understand 
how to act for the good.   
 
Macmurray is aware that it is no small matter to 
break with a foundational idea of Western 
philosophy and The Self as Agent lays out how a 
philosophy based on action avoids the 
contradiction between viewing the self as a 
thinker, an idea which goes back at least as far as 
Plato, and the self as an agent.  In brief, acting 
implies that one has thought about what action to 
take; thought is inherent to and implied by action.  
In this integrated view thought is the activity that 
determines true from false while action is the 
activity that determines right from wrong; there is 
no moral choice without action.  Macmurray lays 
out four principles which guide the development of 
his philosophy of agency: 
• The self exists only as an agent (the self-as-
agent acts in the world and thus is a person 
with both physical and mental faculties). 
• The self as subject is subsumed within the self 
as agent and is not separable (the self-as-
subject is the rational, disembodied mind). 
• The self as subject serves the self as agent (i.e. 
knowledge arises from reflection on action to 
serve future action). 
• The subject and agent are necessary to each 
other (action and knowledge form a unity). 
 
Macmurray was often criticized for his loose use 
of language (Costello, 2002).  Here the term 
“agent” describes the person in the mode of action 
or engaging with the world while “subject” refers 
to the person in the mode of reflection, standing 
isolated from the world as a rational observer in 
Descartes’ tradition.    The agent engages with the 
world not just visually, a sense mode that implies 
disengaged observation, but through touch and 
feelings as well.  I am more in the mode of subject 
when I grade, while I am in the mode of agent 
when I mentor.  In other words, to act the agent 
must “push” against what exists, which 
Macmurray terms the “Other”, see how it pushes 
back, and understand this resistance both rationally 
and emotionally.  There is no subject-object 
duality in action; an agent in action is both subject 
and object since the Other always pushes back.   
 
The Self as Agent next explores what it means to 
be simultaneously a subject and agent, doer and 
thinker.  For Macmurray “I do” integrally includes 
“I think”; I must know the Other to be able to act 
upon it.  Furthermore not any knowing or 
knowledge suffices to inform action.  At the 
moment of acting the agent makes a choice, 
informed by the information available to them, 
which action will best achieve the outcomes the 
agent desires.  To consistently act correctly 
requires the agent develop habits through practice; 
practice which allows one to act correctly is one 
goal of education. Developing habits for action is 
different than acquiring a defined body of 
knowledge.  While knowledge may be useful to 
action, the value of any given knowledge is only 
determined through acting, thus making 
knowledge personal, i.e. knowing.  Knowledge 
and action are distinguished temporally; action 
generates a past by actualizing a possibility and the 
knowing gained from this process illuminates 
possible future actions.   Action only exists in the 
present since the past is determinate (and thus 
knowable) and the future is indeterminate; it is 
what we do now that matters.  Thus both the 
usefulness of knowledge and development of habit 
are determined through action which makes 
possibility determinate.  Through acting we 
directly confront questions of right and wrong that  
both refine our knowledge and develop habits; 
Macmurray points out that what is important is 
“How can I do what is right not how can I know 
what is right to do.”   
 
The actions of agents cause change, but change 
can also happen from a natural or organic event 
that is not caused by an agent.  Thus it is important 
to distinguish the difference between change 
caused by an agent versus that caused by an event.  
Change stemming from the action of an agent is 
based upon reasons and intention while change 
that stems from events has a cause but lacks 
intention.  The causes of change which lack 
intention can be explained by natural laws which 
operate independently of agents; Macmurray refers 
to natural laws that cause change as continuants 
since such processes do not change with time.  As 
is well known in engineering and science, while 
natural laws have predictive capability their 
discovery requires careful abstraction and isolation 
from agents who can affect the outcomes. Agents, 
unlike continuants, are fully capable of changing 
their intention and can utilize natural laws to 
impact the future.  
 
To be able to act effectively to bring about an 
intention an agent must utilize her knowledge of 
the Other. Although not discussed directly by 
MacMurray, action can be informed by what the 
agent herself knows through experience and what 
codified knowledge she can draw upon; here the 
term “knowledge” is used to cover both cases.  
Macmurray frames the relation between acting and 
knowledge through the continuous knowing-action 
cycle illustrated in Figure 1 below called “the 
rhythm of withdrawal and return”.  At the center 
this cycle are the Self (agent) and the Other the 
agent acts against; in The Self as Agent only a 
single agent is considered.  The oval surrounding 
the self and other are events that take place 
sequentially in time.  The upper center part of the 
cycle corresponds to acting and the lower part to 
knowing and/or knowledge (depending on how 
much the agent draws from her own or others’ 
experience).  The cycle plays out as follows:   (1) 
Action begins when the agent has an intention to 
act against the other to achieve some desired 
outcome.  The intention is to change the Other, and 
thus the future, in a way that is beneficial to the 
agent.  This intention is derived from the agent’s 
knowledge of the other and is forward looking into 
the future.  (2) This intention results in an 
anticipation of the outcome of the action which 
may or may not be realized depending on the 
effectiveness of the action.    Anticipation is not 
purely intellectual, but necessarily involves 
elements of feeling.  (3) The agent then has a 
choice of how to perform the action which 
depends on factors such as intention, the 
anticipated outcomes, and what knowledge they 
have of ways to act.     In the moment of pause 
following action the agent withdraws into the self, 
starting the reflective phase of the cycle.  (4) The 
anticipation of the outcome determines how the 
agent pays attention to the effects of their action.  
Choice of attention is necessary since human 
beings are not omniscient; we must choose which 
outcomes of our actions to observe.  (5) By 
focusing attention on some results of the action the 
agent constructs a representation—i.e. schema or 
theoretical model—of the relation between the 
intention and results of the action.  Macmurray 
points out there are two ways to make accurate 
representations.  The first is the path of science 
where specifics or particulars of the Other are 
ignored and the agent generalizes the result of the 
action such that the representation lacks unique 
features so it will apply to a broad class of Other.  
The other path MacMurray calls art because this 
representation focuses on particulars to create as 
detailed and accurate a representation of the 
specific Other at the moment that the action 
occurred and captures elements of emotion.  (6) 
Regardless of the approach used, the agent’s 
creation or refinement of a representation leads to 
knowledge which flips to the action part of the 
cycle, enables the agent to return to action, 
improve the means of his/her action, and thereby 
better fulfill his/her intention and realize the 
anticipated results.   
 
The cycle of withdrawal and return captures the 
relationship between action and knowledge with 
several caveats.  First, although the cycle is drawn 
with a Self and Other pole and reflecting and acting 
phases it is a unity and thus inseparable.  Second, 
the starting point of the cycle is always action of 
some form.  Third, action can be classified into both 
practical activities that are intended to modify the 
Other in some way and theoretical activities that are 
intended to modify the agent’s representation of the 
other.  “A practical activity is one which intends a 
modification of the Other; a theoretical activity is 
one which intends a modification in the 
representation of the Other.” (MacMurray, 1961a, 
p. 178).   Finally, the time spent in each aspect of 
this cycle of withdrawal and return is irrelevant.  An 
agent may spend his/her life devoted to the 
theoretical activity of science with the result that 
his/her actions result in knowledge that allows for 
greater freedom of action whether or not that action 
is ever performed.  
 
Macmurray next defines more precisely both what 
it means to act and what constitutes reflection.  An 
act is defined as the realization of an intention and 
both the start and end of the act are defined 
through the agent’s feelings. The start of an act is 
associated with a feeling of dissatisfaction which 
provides the rationale to act; the agent’s valuation 
of this feeling determines both whether an action 
occurs and which action occurs.  The agent’s 
choice of action arises through prior reflection 
which allows a set of possibilities for action to be 
seen in the Other.  Through a focus of attention the 
agent selects the most valued of these possibilities 
to act upon.  For humans attention is selective so 
the choice to act eliminates, at least at a given 
time, other avenues of action.  Thus valuations 
affect the choice of what to pay attention to, which 
in turn affects the cycle of Figure 1.  Feeling also 
affects the end of the action since the agent will 
feel some level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
depending on whether or not the act accomplished 
the anticipated outcomes.  How the agent acts 
upon this feeling determines the form or mode of 
reflection.  Macmurray defines three modes of 
reflection:  intellectual or scientific, emotional or 
artistic, and inter-personal or religious.  In The Self 
as Agent Macmurray focuses on the intellectual 
and emotional modes; a discussion of the religious 
mode that describes interacting agents is left to 
Persons in Relation.   
 
The intellectual/scientific mode occurs when the 
agent’s attention is focused on ways to build a 
representation that can better inform subsequent 
action.  By applying reason the agent follows the 
path of generalization towards science and draws 
broad conclusions about future action.  This 
scientific mode generalizes to support subsequent 
action, and thus sees the world as a means to future 
action (ends).  Although rational reflection is 
highly effective at informing how to better perform 
subsequent actions it can only inform whether the 
action is effective; emotional valuation of the act is 
needed to determine if it is the right thing to do to 
meet the desired ends.  At the extreme of this 
mode the agent focuses solely on refining their 
representations, perhaps through experiment (a 
form of action).  Macmurray identifies this 
extreme with pure science or reflection for its own 
sake; for example the predictive capability of 
science enables technology but cannot inform the 
moral use of technology.  Alternatively the agent 
may pause at the end of action to emotionally 
gauge the satisfaction she feels; this is the 
emotional/artistic mode.    The emotional mode of 
reflection focuses not on creating a general 
representation to support future action, but rather 
by creating an ideal representation of the moment 
after action that is accurate in all particulars.  By 
capturing the Other in an emotional context that is 
drawn from particulars of the action the agent 
engages in art rather than science.  Art allows us to 
fully experience the action of another.  Since all 
three modes of reflection coexist, it is not 
reasonable to value one over the others unless the 
agent is willing to commit herself to action based 
on this valuation.  In his claim that we act from 
emotions as well as reason Macmurray echoes 
William James (James, 1912).    
Although the intellectual, emotional, and religious 
modes coexist, often within one agent, there are 
key differences.  First, it is possible to go from the 
particular (emotional mode) to the general 
(rational mode) but the agent cannot with any 
accuracy go the other way; i.e. emotions can 
become rational observations, but reason cannot 
accurately create emotion after the fact.  Second, it 
is not reasonable to claim that rational modes are 
objective while emotional modes are subjective 
since both originate within the mind of the agent.  
In other words humans both feel and think, and 
both our feelings and thoughts originate within us 
(based on the cycle shown in figure 1) so that at 
some level the objective and subjective are 
inseparable.  A major claim of Macmurray’s 
philosophy is that any duality is artificial.The 
intellectual/emotional/religious modes together 
define us as a person even if one mode may be 
dominant in some situations.  Third, the exclusive 
reliance upon the rational mode has held back 
Western philosophy from being able to inform 
action in the world to achieve a greater good. 
 
To conclude in The Self as Agent Macmurray 
addresses a key idea of his philosophy of the 
personal, “the world as one action”.   In essence 
the cycle of figure 1 is not series of disconnected 
actions and reflections, but is rather as a single, 
continuous, unfolding action of which the agent is 
but one part.  Macmurray uses the discipline of 
history as an example to explain this concept by 
showing that history both generalizes (science) and 
particularizes (art).  Like history both science and 
art are concerned with time.  Science generalizes 
to create eternal means through knowledge while 
art particularizes to freeze an emotion (the moment 
of pause after action) eternally.  History, like 
science, draws rational generalizations, but its 
focus is on human action on earth rather than on 
continuants.  Historians, like artists, focus on 
particular moments in time.  While these vignettes, 
like a scientist’s experiments, inform an unfolding 
panorama, history does not produce theory since 
history’s generalizations cannot reliably inform 
future action.  Macmurray concludes that history is 
a synthetic discipline where the separate actions of 
many agents are recorded as a continuum that 
reflects societal rather than individual intentions.  
It is through these shared intentions that 
individuals become bound together in a society.  
Since the effectiveness of action depends upon 
knowledge (memory), history synthesizes actions 
and intentions into the memory of society; the 
accuracy of these representations informs how we 
act as a society.  Macmurray considers how valid 
the generalizations of history are; i.e. can history 
only truthfully record the intentions of individual 
agents or can history synthesize to reveal societal 
intentions that involve multiple agents?  To believe 
in the former is to see history as ferreting out 
coincidences between isolated agents while to 
believe in the latter is to accept that one’s actions 
in the world contribute to a greater action.   If we 
accept that we are bound together in action, then 
theoretically there is one history, that of mankind, 
and we may be involved in a single, greater action 
that Macmurray refers to through “the world as 
one action”.   
 
A singular agent asking what their part in the 
grander intention of the world is poses a 
metaphysical question.  Metaphysics is not held in 
high repute in philosophy today (van Inwagen & 
Sullivan, 2014), nor was it in Macmurray’s time 
when logical positivism was on the rise (Costello, 
2002), since the answers it seeks cannot be 
confirmed.  Macmurray points out that this 
disrepute stems from the emphasis that philosophy 
places on “I think”, i.e. rational test and 
verification.  However from the perspective of the 
“I do” metaphysical questions can be verified 
through action.  Echoing pragmatists such as 
William James, Macmurray points out that acting 
as if one knew the answer to a metaphysical 
question has practical consequences which inform 
the cycle of withdrawal and return and thus affect 
the Other. Thus metaphysical questions matter to 
us since we would not seek to live a wholly 
rational (i.e. deterministic) world nor a world in 
which only the isolated mind exists since both 
deny the possibility of action and therefore change.  
The reality of how we actually live in the world 
does not reflect a philosophy based on “I think”.  
Rather we live and act as if both our actions and 
their effect on others matter.  In acting this way we 
determine a way of life that binds the world 
together in one action since my acts affect not only 
the Other but other agents as well.  The reason 
Macmurray starts his philosophy with “I do” is 
that our actions matter and this irrevocably binds 
us to others.  To act we must have some 
conception of the world we wish to exist and an 
intention to bring it about.  Thus we must 
anticipate the ends of our actions and not merely 
the means.   The Self as Agent focuses only on 
developing a philosophy of action, the means, and 
the end for which action should be turned is left to 
Persons in Relation and thus a subsequent paper. 
 
Agency and Engineering Education 
In The Self as Agent Macmurray lays out the first 
part of his philosophy of the personal by asserting 
the primacy of action rather than of thought, and 
that through action the subjective-objective 
dualities of Western philosophy can be resolved.  
Given that engineering is broadly defined as the 
application of science to meet human needs, a 
philosophy that emphasizes the practical over the 
theoretical should have some appeal to engineers.   
 
Several implications for engineering education 
arise from The Self as Agent.  In terms of the 
design of learning experiences, Macmurray’s 
claim that knowing and acting are a unity implies 
that attempt to divide engineering along lines of 
theory versus practice are misplaced.  The unity of 
knowledge and action is captured in the cycle of 
Figure 1, or in his own words:  
“…the rationality of our conclusions does not 
depend alone upon the correctness of our 
thinking.  It depends even more upon the 
propriety of the questions with which we 
concern ourselves.  The primary and critical 
task is the discovery of the problem.  If we ask 
the wrong question the logical correctness of 
our answer is of little consequence.  There is 
of necessity an interplay, in all human 
activities, between theory and practice.” 
(MacMurray, 1961b) 
Engineering educators will recognize several 
research-based practices in Macmurray’s cycle of 
withdrawal and return such as the need for 
multiple representations (Moore, Miller, Lesh, 
Stohlmann, & Kim, 2013) and the importance of 
reflection.  Macmurray’s description of how the 
agent’s intention and anticipation of outcomes 
forces a choice of attention on some aspects of the 
action is commonly seen when students first 
encounter a design challenge.  While expert 
designers consider multiple scenarios before 
making design decisions students (novices) 
typically focus their attention, limiting the design 
space (Atman & Bursic, 1998). 
 
There are also implications for engineering 
education that are not commonly reflected in 
practice.  How students practice the cycle of 
withdrawal and return determines whether they 
develop habits that enable them to act in a way that 
is right.  Here the term right means with moral 
purpose while correct denotes that representations 
and knowledge conform to verifiable truth.  Since 
correct knowledge is used for action, and action 
determines what is right and wrong then ethics 
should be integral, not secondary, to learning.  
Macmurray’s insights on the centrality of ethics 
are highly relevant for a discipline like engineering 
education that consciously or not empowers 
individuals to act as change agents in the world; as 
Norm Augustine points out the actions of 
engineers have consequences (Augustine, 2002).   
 
Engineering educators may also wish to consider 
the moment of pause where action turns to 
reflection in Figure 1.  Macmurray claims that not 
only what we learn but how we act in the future 
depends upon this moment since the focus of 
agent’s attention at the moment of pause impacts 
how representations are developed and thus what 
actions will be valued in the future.  In a very real 
sense this steers a student’s path.  If the agent’s 
actions are to be right as well as correct, 
successfully navigating the turning point requires 
that the agent learns to correctly judge their 
emotional reaction as well as engage in rational 
analysis.  Thus Macmurray’s philosophy suggests 
that engineering educators should develop ways to 
help students reflect on their emotions and also 
learn how to address negative emotional reactions. 
Many works on retention in engineering programs 
speak of a building emotional crisis before one 
trigger event causes the student to leave (Meyer & 
Marx, 2014; Seymour & Hewitt, 1994).  The Self 
as Agent suggests that scientific and artistic modes 
of representation, as well as the inter-personal 
mode developed in Persons in Relation, are 
needed if the individual is to develop moral habits 
and the capacity to determine the ends their actions 
will serve.  While not stated explicitly, the 
philosophy of the personal implies that a person 
who possesses only rational modes of reflection 
can unwittingly become an instrument of tyranny.  
While there has recently been a STEM to STEAM 
movement to incorporate art in STEM (Robelen, 
2011) the published focus is to enhance creativity 
for economic development rather than developing 
the capacity for emotional reflection to develop 
capacity for moral action.   What is said of 
students can also be claimed for engineering 
education more broadly.  Researchers and 
practitioners must not similarly fall prey to a fully 
rational approach lest engineering education 
become fully instrumentalist.  Macmurray makes 
the point eloquently in Learning to be Human 
(Macmurray, 1958): 
“The attempt to turn would-be teachers into 
technicians by teaching them classroom tricks 
is as stupid as it is ineffective…Here, I believe, 
is the greatest threat to education in our own 
society.  We are becoming more and more 
technically minded: gradually we are falling 
victims to the illusion that all problems can be 
solved by proper organization: that when we 
fail it is because we are doing the job in the 
wrong way, and that all that is needed is the 
“know-how”.  To think thus in education is to 
pervert education.  It is not an engineering job.  
It is personal and human.” 
 
It is an open question how the capacity for 
multiple modes of reflection should be developed, 
but a broad interpretation of Macmurray implies 
that moral development requires sufficient agency 
(autonomy) that one’s choices and actions matter.  
Engineering curricula tend to be highly 
constrained, however, limiting student choice.  To 
develop the capacity for agency engineering 
educators should introduce more student autonomy 
in curricular pathways, not just within an 
assignment or course.  Such autonomy would not 
only support moral development but allow 
students to pose and answer metaphysical 
questions.  While such questions are not directly 
addressed in engineering curricula, they have deep 
meaning for students who are still discovering 
their path in life. 
 
Finally Macmurray’s view of the world as one 
action suggests several ways to reconceptualize 
engineering education.  The one action viewpoint 
implies strong interconnection, or viewing the 
world as a system.  From this perspective as the 
world and humans become more reliant on 
technology the importance of engineers’ actions 
increases as does the need for engineering students 
to obtain a more liberal education (MacMurray, 
2012) that encompasses societal and human 
concerns; this is not a new thought in engineering 
education (Mann, 1918).  The one action 
perspective also implies that we should teach 
students not only how to analyze problems using 
engineering decomposition, but also how to 
undertake a holistic, synthetic analysis of their 
solution from emotional and inter-personal modes 
of representation.  While we typically train 
students to perform rational analyses, Macmurray 
suggests that possessing only a scientific view of 
the world limits the agent to serve as a means to 
someone else’s end rather than working towards 
their own ends.  The question then becomes how 
can we help students envision the ends towards 
which they will choose to work?  How we envision 
a worthwhile end, how we define the common 
good, is a question Macmurray addresses in his 
second set of Gifford Lectures. 
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Figure 1:  Macmurray’s “Cycle of Withdrawal and Return” that takes 
place sequentially over time. 
 
	
